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RITALIN TO ROUNDUP:
EXPANDING THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY STATUTORY
EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION TO AGRICULTURE
Jennifer Carter-Johnson*
Abstract
The modern agricultural biotechnology industry
developed from a small cottage industry based on
selective crop breeding into a multi-billion dollar
industry based on the isolation and insertion of
genes that code for commercially valuable crop
traits. As it grew, the industry relied on patent
protection to recoup its investment into new
research and development of genetically
engineered (GE) crops. A recent billion dollar
patent infringement damage award to Monsanto
based only on research activities of its competitors
testifies to the importance of thatpatentprotection.
Had the Monsanto patent infringement case been
between two pharmaceutical companies creating
genetics-based drugs, the outcome would have
been different. Instead of a one billion dollar
award, the patent verdict would have been one of
noninfringement. The difference between the two
patent infringement cases lies with the HatchWaxman Act's statutory experimental use
exception.
The Hatch-Waxman Act controls the regulation of
generic drugs by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). Along with an abbreviated
generic drug approvalprocess, the Hatch-Waxman
Act includes a statutory experimental use exception
to patent infringement allowing pharmaceutical
companies to conduct research on patented drugs if
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the research might be used in a regulatory
submission to the FDA.
This Article explores the history of the statutory
experimental use exception and argues that it
should apply to the agricultural biotechnology
industry's development of GE crops. The Supreme
Court's interpretationof the statute has resulted in
a very broad experimental use exception, limited
only by whether an invention is regulated by the
FDA. Since GE crops are regulated by the FDA,
the statutory experimental use exception should
apply to their development. Such a broadening of
the experimental use exception would have
potentially vast impacts on the patent valuations as
well as the structure of the entire agricultural
biotechnology industry.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2012, Monsanto Company and Monsanto Technology LLC
(Monsanto) won a one billion dollar ($1,000,000,000) award for patent
infringement in its case against E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Company
(DuPont) and Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (Pioneer).' What
makes this judgment exceptional is not only the staggering damage
award, but also the lack of any marketed product. There was no
blockbuster drug, no pervasive technological gadget, not even a widely
adopted genetically engineered (GE) crop. Rather, the award was based
on Monsanto's evidence of the reasonable royalty it might have charged
in order to conduct research using its patented technology.
Monsanto is one of the largest agricultural biotechnology companies
in the world; it develops and produces GE crops among other products.
At issue in the patent infringement suit was Monsanto's patented
Roundup Ready soybean and corn traits. The Roundup Ready trait
confers resistance to the herbicide glyphosate to those crops that express
it.,
In 2002, Monsanto licensed the Roundup Ready traits to DuPont and
Pioneer.3 The terms of the license allowed the companies to sell
soybean and corn seeds expressing the patented traits. Four years later,
the companies developed their own proprietary glyphosate resistant
traits. In addition to the sales allowed by the license, DuPont and
Pioneer had begun to conduct a research program to stack 4 the Roundup
Ready trait with their own proprietary traits. Monsanto sued for patent
infringement for the unlicensed
use of the Roundup Ready technology in
5
the research program.
Had such a patent-infringement case been between two
pharmaceutical companies, the outcome would have been completely
different. Instead of a one billion dollar award, the verdict would have
been one of noninfringement.
If patent law is supposed to be
technologically neutral as to its protections, why is there such a
difference in outcome between bio-agricultural and pharmaceutical
research?

1. Reading of the Verdict for Monsanto Co. v. E.L DuPont De Nemours, No. 4:09-CV-686
ERW, 2012 WL 3765059, (E.D. Mo. Aug. 1,2012), 2012 WL 8438518.
2. Roundup is the brand of glyphosate herbicide that is marketed by Monsanto.
3. See Andrew Pollack, Dispute Endsfor Monsanto and DuPont, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2002),
http:/Iwww.nytimes.com/2002/04/03/business/03BlOT.html.
4. Stacking is the process of combining the genes for multiple traits into one seed for
expression. Isabelle E.J.A Frangoisa et al., Different approachesfor multi-transgene-stackingin plants,
163 PLAN Sci. 281, 281 (2002).
5. Monsanto Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, No. 4:09CV00686 ERW, 2012 WL 5397601, at
*1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2012).
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The key difference between Monsanto and the pharmaceutical
hypothetical is application of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 6 The HatchWaxman Act controls the approval and regulation of generic drugs by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Along with an abbreviated
generic drug approval process, the Hatch-Waxman Act includes a
statutory experimental use exception, allowing pharmaceutical
companies to conduct research on patented technologies if the research
might be used in a regulatory submission to the FDA.
This Hatch-Waxman statutory experimental use exception has been
expanded from its initial use for development of generic drugs to
include newly developed and marketed drugs and medical devices
which are marketed under a trademarked brand name (branded drugs).8
However, the Monsanto court was skeptical that the statutory
9
experimental use exception could be expanded to include GE crops.
The applicability of the statutory experimental use exception is
important to the agricultural biotechnology industry in light of the
industry's reliance on patent protection for GE crops. Application of an
experimental use exception would allow for faster follow-on innovation;
companies could begin to develop, but not market, new GE crops
containing patented traits. On the other hand, implementation of an
experimental use exception would represent a major loss of competitive
advantage and licensing revenue to patent holders. Therefore, a
clarification of the implementation of the Hatch-Waxman statutory
experimental use exception to the agricultural biotechnology industry is
needed.
This Article explores the development of the statutory experimental
use exception of Hatch-Waxman and argues that the Monsanto court
was wrong to not consider the defense. The experimental use exception
should apply to the agricultural biotechnology industry's development
6. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.). In 2003,
Congress amended this scheme in Title XI of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, tit. XI, subtits. A-B, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448-64
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2010) states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United
States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or
veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using
recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving
site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.
8. See infra Part V.B.
9. Monsanto Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, No. 4:09CV00686 ERW, 2010 WL 3039210, at
*10-12 (E.D. Mo. July 30, 2010).
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of GE crops. Part II describes the development and regulation of the
modem agricultural biotechnology industry. Part III explains the
regulation of the pharmaceutical industry as background for the
development of the statutory experimental use exception. Part IV
explains the evolution of the statutory experimental use exception
through caselaw. Part V analyzes caselaw surrounding the statutory
experimental use exception in light of GE crop regulations to argue why
the experimental use exception might apply. Part VI concludes with a
broader perspective of the application of the statutory experimental use
exception in the agricultural biotechnology industry.
II. DEVELOPMENT AND

REGULATION OF THE MODERN AGRICULTURAL

BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY

The agricultural industry has changed radically over time. Man began
to impact the genetic heritage of crops long before he understood the
concept of DNA. Direct manipulation of crop DNA followed that
understanding and led to the modem agricultural biotechnology industry
and production of GE crops. In many ways, these changes in
agricultural biotechnology products and the structure of the agriculture
industry were ushered in due to the gradual application of intellectual
property law associated with plants, particularly patents.' 0 This industry
structure has been further supported by the need for regulatory approval
of GE crops before marketing. Therefore, as this Article discusses the
implementation of an experimental use exception to patent infringement
by the agricultural biotechnology industry, it is important to understand
the industry's history and the impact of patents and regulations on the
industry.
A. History of the Development of Genetically EngineeredCrops

1. Early Trait Selection and Traditional Breeding
Agriculture is very likely the oldest human industry. Evidence of
domesticated wheat dating back 10,000 years has been found by
archeologists in the area around southeastern Turkey.' 1 Over the
subsequent 2,000 years, humans domesticated other plants and animals,

10. See infra Part lI.B.
11. See, e.g., Manfred Heun et a]., Site of Einkorn Wheat Domestication Identified by DNA
Fingerprinting, 278 SCI. 1312, 1312-13 (1997) and DANIEL ZOHARY ET AL., DOMESTICATION OF
PLANTS IN THE OLD WORLD 1-3 (4th ed. 2012).
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12
including barley, chickpeas, peas, beans, flax, sheep, goats, and pigs.
By 6800 B.C., rice, currently the world's most important food crop, was
domesticated.13 This domestication of plants and animals was, broadly
speaking, the first application of biotechnology to agriculture; as
humans were breeding these plants and animals and selecting traits
advantageous to humans. 14 Such traits included larger seed size in
plants, resistance to pests and diseases, and faster growth. 15 Animals
with the best traits were bred together and seeds from the best plants
were saved for the next growing season.
Human skill at selecting crops and selectively breeding animals for
advantageous traits continued to grow, but sexual reproduction in plants
With the
was not definitively identified until the late 1600s. 16
identification of plant sexual reproduction, selective breeding of plants
with advantageous traits and cross-breeding of related plants was
suddenly possible. However, there was no true understanding of why
selective breeding worked until the mid-1 800s, when an Austrian monk
by the name of Gregor Mendel began experimenting with breeding of
the pea plant. 17
While it was known that breeding of plants and animals with
advantageous traits often resulted in offspring with similar traits,
Mendel's studies revealed how these traits pass from parents to
offspring. 18 His experiments on the breeding of pea plants with certain
traits revealed the rules of heredity. 19 Mendel found in his studies of
pea plants that some traits were "dominant" and would be passed
through generations more frequently while other traits were "recessive"
and were expressed less frequently in subsequent generations of the

12. See generally Melinda A. Zeder, The Origins of Agriculture in the Near East, 52 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 221, 221-35 (2011).
13. See generally Dorian Q. Fuller et al., The Domestication Process and Domestication Rate in
Rice: Spikelet Basesfrom the Lower Yangtze, 323 Sc. 1607, 1607-10 (2009).
14. See id.
15. Biotechnology has broadly been defined as "the use of living cells, bacteria, etc., to make
http://www.merriamONLINE
DICTIONARY,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
useful
products."
webster.com/dictionary/biotechnology (last visited July 17, 2015). Recently, many authors have begun
using the term biotechnology in its application to food production to specifically refer to the use of
recombinant DNA technology to transfer genetic information from one organism to another.
16. Rudolf Jakob Camerarius (1665-1721) is thought to be the first researcher to demonstrate
sexual reproduction in plants. DHARAM P. ABROL, POLLINATION BIOLOGY 26 (2012).
17. Gregor Johann Mendel (1822-1884) experimented on the breeding of pea plants between
1856 and 1863. His work was published in 1865 but mostly ignored until after his death. A translation
of Mendel's presentation of his work, Experiments in Plant Hybridization (1865) can be found at
http://www.mendelweb.org/Mendel.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2015). See also Daniel L. Hartl &
Vitezslav Orel, What Did GregorMendel Think He Discovered?, 131 GENETICS 245, 245 (1992).
18. For an analysis of Mendel's experiments, see Hartl & Orel, supra note 17.
19. Id.
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plant. 20 Importantly, Mendel found that these frequencies were very
predictable, allowing for actual analysis in the breeding of specific
traits.2 1 Mendel's elucidation of the principles of inheritance is the
foundation of the science now known as genetics, though the importance
of his work was not recognized until the beginning of the 20th century. 22
Mendel's work in determining how heredity worked has had a profound
impact on the agriculture industry.
2. The Rise of the Seed Companies
As understanding of the science underlying crop breeding developed,
so too did the methods of production and distribution of seed. Through
the 18th century in the United States, seed saving and local sharing was
most common, with farmers saving the best seed from one year to plant
in the next. Distribution of seed was generally local, though some
wealthy landowners would collect seed while traveling and distribute it
to their friends.2 3
In the early 19th century, however, the U.S. government began to
institute programs designed to distribute valuable plant varieties. In
1819, the Secretary of the Treasury requested that ambassadors and
other foreign-stationed government officials collect seed from around
the world and return it to the United States.2 4
In 1839, the
Commissioner of Patents obtained funding for the collection and free
distribution of seed to farmers in order to increase crop diversity in the
United States. 2 5 By 1855, the Patent Office was distributing over a
million packages of seed to farmers each year, allowing farmers in
different regions to examine new varieties that may have advantageous
traits.2 6 This effort by the U.S. federal government was enhanced with
the establishment of the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA), which was charged by Congress with, among other tasks, the
collection, propagation, and distribution of new and valuable seed stock

20. Id. at 249.

21. Id. at 249-50.
22. Id. at 245.
23. Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson are both known to have collected interesting crop
seeds in their travels, sending those seeds back to the United States to be used in their own gardens and
distributed to their friends. NELSON KLOSE, AMERICA'S CROP HERITAGE: THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN
PLANT INTRODUCTION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 13-19 (1950).

24. Idat26.
25. Id. at 38. This source refers to the Commissioner of Patents as Oliver Ellsworth, though his
name was Henry L. Ellsworth.
26. JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492-2000,56 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol84/iss1/4

8

Carter-Johnson: Ritalin to Roundup: Expanding the Pharmaceutical Industry Statuto

2016]

RITALIN TO ROUNDUP

27
and plant varieties.
The seed distribution landscape began to change near the end of the
19th century. Private companies began to develop and distribute seed,
and the USDA halted its free seed distribution program in 1924.28 The
rise of the private company as a seed producer coincided with two
groundbreaking changes in the technology of plant-variety productionhybrid crops and induced mutations.
First, using the understanding of heredity gained from Gregor Mendel
and other scientists, these companies began producing highly inbred
29
strains of plants which strongly displayed some trait of interest.
Inbred plants are created by the repeated crossing of genetically related
plants that possess some desired trait, such as drought resistance. If
these plants are continually inbred over numerous generations, the
resulting plants are nearly clones of each other; all will possess the
desired trait and sometimes that trait is even enhanced by the process.3 °
However, there was often a downside to these inbred lines in that
many unwanted traits, such as slow growth, may also become enhanced.
Indeed, unhealthy offspring resulting from inbreeding has been a longrecognized problem. 3 1 Therefore, by themselves, these inbred plant
varieties make poor material for crops due to an overall lack of health,
though they may possess some trait or traits that are considered by the
grower to be desirable.
This problem was overcome with the discovery that crossing two
inbred lines of a plant such as corn often would result in the offspring
displaying the advantageous traits, being much healthier than either of
the inbred parental plants, and regaining the healthiness of the noninbred plant type. 32 This effect is known as hybrid vigor. It resulted in
seed producing companies being able to systematically plan for and
produce seeds that, in turn, would produce healthy crops that strongly
displayed one or more desirable traits, such as drought resistance or
large fruit production. The production of these highly inbred parental
lines required dedicated specialists working at these private companies

27. Act of May 15, 1862, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387, 37 Cong. Ch. 72.
28. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 26, at 71.
29. See Jorge Femandez-Comejo, The Seed Industry in U.S. Agriculture: An Explorationof Crop
Seed Markets, Regulation, Industry Structure, and Research and Development, USDA-ECON.
RESEARCH SERV. AGRIC. INFO. BULL. 786, 2-4 (2004); James Ming Chen, An Agricultural Law
Jeremiad: The Harvest Is Past, the Summer Is Ended, and the Seed is Not Saved, 2014 Wisc. L. REV.
235, 244 (2014) [hereinafter Chen, Jeremiad].
30. Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection Act in
Furtheranceof Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 105, 133 (2005) [hereinafter, Chen, The
Parable].
31. George H. Shull, The Composition of a Field of Maize, 4 AM. BREEDERS ASSOC. REP. 296,
296 (1908).
32. Id.
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or in universities and was rarely accomplished by individual farmers.
For the seed companies, hybrid lines had the great advantage of
requiring farmers to purchase new seed each year. While many of these
hybrids produced viable offspring, hybrids do not breed true, meaning
that only a percentage of the offspring actually would display the
desired traits if the farmer tried to save the seeds produced by the hybrid
plants for later replanting. 33 In order to maintain efficiency in crop
production, the farmer would have to repurchase seed from the seed
company each year rather than save seed from year to year. The seed
company would breed a new batch of hybrid seed from the inbred
parental lines for each growing season, necessitating that the seed
producer maintain the inbred lines. These inbred lines are jealously
guarded by seed companies and protected as trade secrets.34
A second technological leap favoring the rise of seed companies was
the method of producing new traits using induced mutation.35 Naturally,
mutations in the genes of plants and animals occur at a slow rate and, in
fact, are the starting point for evolution and speciation. In the 1940s,
scientists found that the rate of mutation could be enhanced using either
radiation or chemicals to cause mutation in the genes of seeds. 36 Many
of the resulting mutations would have adverse effects on the plants, but
a very small minority of plants would demonstrate new, enhanced, or
otherwise desirable characteristics that scientists could then reproduce as
they would a traditional strain. 37 However, this method was labor
intensive as every mutated seed had to be grown and evaluated. Also,
the mutations that occurred were random in nature. 38 Despite these
hurdles, induced mutation remained a popular method of producing new
plant varieties through the 1970s, a decade that saw the beginning of the
next groundbreaking technology in crop seed production-direct genetic
modification using recombinant DNA .

33. Fernandez-Comejo, supra note 29, at 42.
34. It is common to find a low percentage of inbred seeds contaminating a bag of hybrid seeds
despite the many precautions taken by the seed producers to prevent this mixing. By planting a large
number of hybrid seeds and isolating the slowest growing, the initial inbred lines can often be recovered
by competitors. For an in-depth explanation of "chasing selfs," see Chen, The Parable,supra note 30,
at 133-34.
35. An induced mutation is "any alteration in the genetic material of an organism, a cell, or a
virus, produced by exposure to a mutagen". ROBERT C. KING ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF GENETICS 242
(8th ed. 2013).
36. See A. Micke et al., Induced Mutationsfor Crop Improvement, 7 MUTATION BREEDING REV.
1, 21-3 (1990); see also generally Ake Gustaffson, Mutations in Agricultural Plants, 33 HEREDITAS 1
(1947).
37. Micke, supranote 36, at 102.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2-3; infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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3. The Development of Genetically Engineered Crops
Long before there was any knowledge of genetics or DNA, people
unknowingly had been manipulating the genes of plants and animals
through selective breeding and later through induced mutation. Only
recently, however, advances in scientific knowledge have allowed direct

and targeted manipulation of the genes of organisms, including crop
plants.
These advances, generically termed recombinant DNA
technology, have allowed scientists directly to introduce foreign DNA

into a plant's genome. Where before technologies such as crossbreeding
were limited to related species, scientists easily
now can introduce a
40
bacterial gene into a crop plant such as coM.
Before the 1940s, the model of Mendelian inheritance taught that
traits were controlled by one or more genes. However, the method by
which the information represented by the gene was actually physically
carried and passed on to progeny was a mystery. It was commonly

thought that genes were made up of proteins, as proteins were a complex
molecule produced in abundance in all plant and animal cells. 4 1 It
wasn't until 1944 that DNA was proposed as the actual information

carrying molecule within cells. 42 Less than a decade later, James
Watson and Francis Crick proposed a double helix structure for DNA. 43
Over the next two decades, the way DNA was used to code for

hereditary information and how DNA was copied into progeny was
elucidated. By the beginning of the 1970s, the mechanism by which
DNA worked in the cell was beginning to be understood. What
remained was to figure out how to manipulate the DNA and, by
extension, the cell's genes and resulting traits.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, proteins were identified which

could cut DNA and other proteins were found that could repair these
cuts. 44 Using these newly discovered tools, scientists were able to insert
40. For example, Bt-com is so named because it contains a gene from a bacterium Bacillus
thurigiensis. The gene produces a protein that kills a major com pest. Jennifer L. Price et al., Insect
Resistance Management for Bt Corn: An Assessment of Community Refuge Schemes, 9(3)
AGBIOFORUM 129, 129 (2006).
41. Maclyn McCarty, DiscoveringGenes are Made of DNA, 421 NATURE 406, 406 (2003).
42. Oswald Avery, Colin MacLeod, and Maclyn McCarty suggested in 1944 that DNA was the
molecule within cells that carried information involved in heredity, i.e. the genes. Their work was not
well received at first as proteins were thought to be much more complex (human proteins are made of
chains of twenty-one different amino acids whereas DNA is made up of only four nucleic acids). See
Oswald T. Avery et al., Studies on the Chemical Nature of the Substance Inducing Transformation of
Pneumococcal Types: Induction of Transformation by a DesoxyribonucleicAcid FractionIsolatedfrom
Pneumococcus Type 111, 79 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL MED. 137 (1944); McCarty, supra note 41 at 406.
43. James D. Watson & Francis H. C. Crick, A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171
NATURE 737, 737 (1953).
44. Restriction endonucleases, or restriction enzymes, are proteins that recognize a specific DNA
sequences and cut DNA at that site. The first identified restriction endonuclease, Hind I1, was isolated
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new stretches of DNA, and thus new genes, into an organism's genome.
The first genetically modified organisms produced by recombinant DNA
technology were created in the early 1970s when the laboratories of
Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen conducted a series of experiments
inserting genes that conferred resistance to antibiotics such as
kanamycin and tertracycline into the genome of bacteria, resulting in
new antibiotic-resistant strains of bacteria.45
This technology would soon make its way into use for plants,
allowing for the creation of transgenic varieties of crops.4 6 Transgenic
simply means that foreign DNA was inserted into the native genome.47
This new technology allowed scientists to insert-relatively easilygenes producing traits of interest into crop plants. This method was
much more efficient than older methods, such as induced mutation, that
could not target the trait of interest and instead relied on analysis of
many progeny in hopes of finding one that displayed the traits of
interest. 48 Furthermore, recombinant DNA methods could move genes
from one organism into a completely different species, a feat traditional
crossbreeding could never hope to achieve.4 9

These transgenic plants had a great advantage over inbred lines or
induced mutations in that only the gene of interest became altered.5°
Inbred lines of plants enhanced numerous traits, often including
disadvantageous ones resulting in overall poor health of the inbred
line. 51 To avoid this issue in the crop seed, hybrid strains were produced

from the Haemophilus influenzae bacterium. See Hamilton 0. Smith & K. W. Wilcox, A Restriction
Enzyme from Hemophilus influenza:. L Purification and generalproperties, 51(2) J. MOL. BIOL. 379,
379 (1970); Thomas J. Kelly & Hamilton 0. Smith, A restriction enzymefrom Hemophilus influenza: I.
Base Sequence of the Recognition Site, 51 J. MOL. BIOL. 393 (1970). DNA ligases are proteins that help
join cut DNA pieces back together. The first identified DNA ligase, T4 DNA Ligase, was identified by
multiple laboratories in 1967. See e.g., Bernard Weiss & Charles C. Richardson, Enzymatic breakage
and joining of deoxyribonucleic acid, L Repair of single-strand breaks in DNA by an enzyme system
from Escherichia coli infected with T4 bacteriophage, 57 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATL. ACAD. Sci.
U.S.A. 1021, 1021 (1967).
45. See generally, e.g., John Morrow et al., Replication and Transcription of Eukaryotic DNA in
Escherichiacoli, 71 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT. ACAD. Sci. U.S.A. 1743 (1974); Stanley N. Cohen et
al., Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids In Vitro, 70 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATL. ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 3240 (1973).
46. See generally, e.g., Robert T. Fraley et al., Expression of Bacterial Genes in Plant Cells, 80
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATL. ACAD. SI. U.S.A. 4803 (1983).

47. Transgenic is defined as "being or used to produce an organism or cell of one species into
which one or more genes of another species have been incorporated." MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transgenic (last visited July 17, 2015).
48. Micke, supra note 36, at 4.
49. See Gabrielle J. Persley & James N. Siedow, Applications of Biotechnology to Crops:
Benefits and Risks, 12 COUNCIL FOR AGRIC. SC. & TECH. 1, 1 (1999); see e.g., Price, supranote 40.
50. Persley & Siedow, supra note 49, at 2.
51. Id.
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from the inbred lines, but hybrid plants do not breed true. 52 The new
transgenic plants, however, produced using recombinant DNA
technology, breed true, alleviating the need for hybrids. 53 But this
created another problem for the seed producers: these new seeds were
self-replicating. Farmers once again could save seed from year to year
with no decrease in crop production efficiency. 54 Unlike with a hybrid
seed, all progeny of the transgenic plants carry the new traits.55
rely on patent protection to prevent
Therefore, seed companies must
56
replication of their inventions.
B. The Impact of IntellectualProperty on Commercial Seed Production
It has been hypothesized that one of the drivers of the sudden
explosion of technological advances in the seed production side of the
agriculture industry is expanding intellectual property protection.57
Early seed companies relied on trade secret protections. 58 However,
over time stronger types of intellectual property protection emerged
until the agricultural biotechnology industry developed with reliance on
patent protection. As this patent protection evolves, it will impact the
structure of the entire industry.
1. Evolving Intellectual Property Protections for Plants
Between 1900 and 1970, the only intellectual property protection that
applied to most crop plants was trade secret protection.5 9 In that
environment, many small, regional seed companies thrived, producing
numerous inbred lines they jealously60 guarded and then bred together to
form hybrid seed for sale to farmers.
52. See Femandez-Comejo, supra note 29; and Chen, Jeremiad,supranote 29, at 244.
53. Jeremy P. Oczek, In the Aftermath of the "Terminator"Technology Controversy: Intellectual
Property Protectionsfor Genetically Engineered Seeds and the Rights to Save and Replant Seed, 41
BOSTON COL. L. REv. 627, 627-28 (2000).
54. See Jeremy N. Sheff, Self-Replicating Technologies, 16 STANFORD TECH. L. REv. 229

(2013).
55. This is true so long as the transgenic plants did not cross-pollinate with another variety that
did not carry the trait of interest.
56. Genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs) designed to prevent self-replication of

genetically engineered seeds have been proposed but have not, to this point, been commercially
implemented. See, e.g., Yi Sang et al., Gene Use Restriction Technologies for Transgenic Plant
Bioconfinement, II PLANT BIOTECH. J. 649, 649-50 (2013).
57. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Patents, Genetically Modified Foods and IP Overreaching, 64 SMU L.

REv., 859, 862-63 (2011).
58. See Chen, Jeremiad,supra note 29, at 244-48.

59. Id. at 244.
60. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 26, at 106; Donald N. Dubik, Biotechnology in the 1930s: the
Development of Hybrid Maize, 2 NATuRE REvIEws: GENETICS 69, 72 (2001).
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While the Plant Patent Act of 1930 allowed for a type of patent
protection of asexually reproduced plants, most food-crop plants are
sexually reproduced and thus are not eligible subject matter for a plant
patent.6 ' Sexually reproduced plants were not provided with patent
protection because, at the time, cultivators thought that sexual
62
reproduction of the plant would destroy any special characteristics.

Sexually reproduced plants were thought to not breed true to type, while
asexually reproducing plants were thought to be much better for
maintaining unique and identifiable characteristics of the variety.63 As a
result, seed producers relied on internal secrecy, trade secret laws, and
the fact that hybrid plants do not breed true to protect their intellectual
property from being copied.64

Forty years later, however, Congress recognized that seed producers
could indeed maintain stable characteristics in sexually reproducing
plants and passed the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA).65
This Act provided a pathway to obtain a Certificate of Protection that
gave patent-like protection to sexually reproduced plants, including

most crop plants. 66
However, the PVPA contained a research
exemption 67 and also a "farmer's exemption," which allowed farmers to
save seed for replanting on their own farm. 68 While these farmers
would not be able to sell this seed for replanting elsewhere, this
exemption made protection under the PVPA much less valuable to the
seed producers as they wanted to be able to sell their new transgenic

seed types to the same farmers each growing season, much as they had
61. 35 U.S.C §§ 161-164. Section 161 reads:
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant,
including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber
propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
62. Note that plants capable of sexual reproduction are eligible for plant patent protection if the
plant is also asexually reproduced, such as by cuttings. United States Patent and Trademark Office,
Manual
of
Patent
Examining
Procedure,
§
1601,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/sl60l.html (last visited July 17, 2015).
63. Femandez-Comejo, supra note 29, at 20.
64. See supra notes 52 and 59 and accompanying text.
65. Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 7 and 28 U.S.C.)
66. Id. See also JOHN POEHLMAN & D. A. SLEPER, BREEDING FIELD CROPS, 20 (John Wiley &
Sons 1995).
67. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (1970). The research exemption reads "[tihe use and reproduction of a
protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement."
See also Chen, The Parable,supra note 30.
68. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1970). The farmer's exemption reads:
it shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by the person
from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the
variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on
the farm of the person ....
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done with hybrid seed strains. 69
Perhaps the most effective way to accomplish this goal would be to
extend utility patent protection to plants and seed. However, the general

understanding of the day prevented issuance of utility patents for living
organisms such as plants that were considered products of nature, and in
fact, the Plant Patent Act and PVPA had been passed in part due to that

understanding. 70 This understanding changed with a series of
Supreme
71
Court cases beginning in 1980 with Diamond v. Chakrabarty.

Chakrabarty was a microbiologist interested in finding new ways to

clean oil spills. 72

By inserting foreign DNA into a bacterium, he

developed a transgenic strain of bacteria that was able to break down
multiple components of crude oil. 73 He applied for a utility patent on
his invention in which he claimed the transgenic bacteria itself. 74 The
examiner for this patent application rejected his claims to the transgenic
bacteria under the reasoning that bacteria, as living things and products

of nature, are not patentable under 35 U.S.C. §101.75
The rejection was appealed and eventually found its way to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court determined that a live but humanmade microorganism was patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§101.76

The Court held that the transgenic bacterium was a

"manufacture" or a "composition of matter" not found in nature.7 7 This
reasoning was quickly adopted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

(USPTO) and expanded utility patent protection to transgenic plants as
well as microorganisms. 78

Thus, the seed producing industry was

provided with the ability to obtain strong utility patent protection for
transgenic seeds and the USPTO issued approximately 1,800 utility

69. For a fuller discussion of the PVPA and its impact on the agricultural biotechnology
industry, see Chen, The Parable,supra note 30, at 132-39.
70. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311 (1980). The Court stated: "Prior to 1930, two
factors were thought to remove plants from patent protection. The first was the belief that plants, even
those artificially bred, were products of nature for purposes of the patent law."
71. 447 U.S. 303.
72. Id. at 303, 305.
73. Id. at 305.
74. Id. at 305-06.
75. Id. at 306. 35 U.S.C. § 101 reads "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
76. Id. at 305, 309.
77. Id. at 309-10.
78. See Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) USPQ 443, 447 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1985)
(ruling that plants could be proper subject matter for a utility patent even though plants also may be
protected under the Plant Patent Act or the Plant Variety Protection Act).
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patents to seed companies over the next sixteen years.79 Unlike a PVPA
Certificate of Protection, utility patent protection does not include any
exemptions for seed saving. 80 In 2001, the Supreme Court held in
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred that sexually reproduced
plants eligible for protection under the PVPA also were eligible for
protection under utility patents. 8 ' This ruling confirmed the USPTO
actions considering transgenic plants to be patentable subject matter for
utility patents.
Under this new application of patent law, the industry moved quickly
in producing transgenic food crops. In 1994, the FLAVR SAVR tomato
became the first transgenic food crop destined for human consumption
approved by the FDA. 82 The FLAVR SAVR tomato had foreign DNA
inserted into the tomato's genome that was designed to lengthen
ripening time and, thus, shelf life.8 3 The FDA determined that the
transgenic tomato was as safe for human consumption as the equivalent
nontransgenic tomatoes.84
Herbicide-resistant food crops would be developed shortly thereafter
with the 1996 introduction of the transgenic Roundup Ready soybean
seeds and the 1998 introduction of Roundup Ready corn, both Monsanto
creations. 85 Today in the U.S., nearly 90% of all soybeans and corn
grown are transgenic. 86
2. The Changing Scope of Patent Protection
While patent protection was a clear boon to the burgeoning
agriculture industry, the contours of that protection experienced change

79. E.J. Sease, History and Trends in AgriculturalBiotechnology PatentLaw from a Litigator's
Perspective, 38, 40 in AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SEEDS OF
CHANGE, (Jay P. Kesan, ed. 2007) [hereinafter SEEDS OF CHANGE].

80. Chen, The Parable,supra note 30, at 133.
81. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
82. See FDA, Agency Summary Memorandum Re: Consultation with Calgene, Inc., Concerning
FLA VR

SA VR

TM

Tomatoes

(May

17,

1994),

http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/GEPlants/Submissions/ucm225043.htm;
see also Rita
Batista & Maria Margarida Oliveira, Facts and Fiction of Genetically EngineeredFood, 27(5) TRENDS
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 277, 277 (2009).

83. FDA, Agency Summary, supranote 82.
84. Id.
85. MONSANTO,

Company

History, http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/pages/monsanto-

history.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
86. See USDA, Recent Trends in GE Adoption 1996-2014, http://www.ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/adoption-of-genetically-engineered-crops-in-theus/recent-trends-inge-adoption.aspx
(last
visited Feb. 22, 2015).
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and will continue to change.87 Judicial decisions have impacted
intellectual property protection and the rights of GE crop producers. For
example, only a few years after the expansion of patent protection to
plants, the Federal Circuit significantly narrowed the application of the
common law experimental use exception, favoring patent holders within
the industry. 88 More recently, cases narrowing the conception of patent
exhaustion as applied to seeds favored the industry. 89 This narrowing of
available patentable subject matter left less protection for traits. Patents
confer exclusive rights to inventors for limited periods of time 9° , in
order to incentivize the production of new inventions 9 . But patents are
not without their limitations.
Beginning in the early 19th century, patent rights were interpreted to
include a common law experimental use exception to infringement
liability. This experimental use exception can be traced to the 1813 case
of Whittemore v. Cutter, in which Justice Story established the
experimental use exception as a defense to patent infringement if the92
infringement occurred during the process of scientific research.
Justice Story recognized that the founding fathers had not intended
patents to preclude scientific research when he wrote that "it could never
have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man who [used a
patented invention] ... merely for philosophical experiments, or for the
purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency . . . to produce its desired
effects. 9 3 This common law experimental use exception evolved to
encompass uses in which the invention was not made for profit94 ;

moreover, use of a patented invention in order to improve the invention
and 9procure
an improvement patent was not considered to be a for-profit
5
use.

The common law experimental use exception began shrinking in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. Courts began to consider the commercial
interests of the patent user and significantly narrowed the application of
the common law experimental use exception. In Pitcairn v. United

87. Internationally, there is debate as to whether GE crops should have patent protection at all.
Andrew Torrance, Intellectual Property as the Third Dimension of GMO Regulation, 16 KANSAS J.
LAW & PUB. POL. 257, 260 (2007).

88. Roche Products v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1984), supersededby
statute as recognizedin Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
89. See, e.g., Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).

90. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
92. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 Fed. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (17,600).

93. Id.
94. Swain v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass 1813) (No. 12,391).
95. Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371, 375 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
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States96 , manufacturers used patented technologies in building and
testing helicopters. The Pitcairn Court rejected the argument that this
use of the patented technology fell under the experimental use
exception, holding instead that the infringing tests were required to
prepare the helicopters for sale. 97 As a result, the experimental use
exception was not available.98
Subsequent decisions from the Federal Circuit further narrowed the
application of the experimental use exception to the point of near
extinction. In Roche Products v. Bolar PharmaceuticalCo., a generic

drug manufacturer was using a patented drug to perform experiments for
submission to the Food and Drug Administration once the patents had
expired. 99 The Roche court held that the use of the patented drug was
not an experimental use when the activity is merely "in the guise of
'scientific inquiry' because the activity had "'definite cognizable, and
'
not insubstantial commerce prospects. ""
The Federal Circuit in
Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp. further noted that testing for

a commercial purpose is infringing, even if commercialization proves
unsuccessful.101

Judge Rader's concurrence in Embrex went even

further, saying that the Patent Act disallows the common law
experimental use exception entirely.' 02 The death knell to practical use
of the common law experimental use exception sounded in Madey v.
Duke University when the Federal Circuit held that the non-profit or
commercial status of an accused infringer did not matter as long as the
infringing activity furthered a legitimate business interest. 103
The line of cases limiting the application of the common law
experimental use exception occurred concurrently with the recognition
that plants could be patented, the birth of the agricultural biotechnology
industry, and the initial research and development of GE crops. The
limitation on the common law experimental use exception strengthened
the ability of patent holders to control a competitor's use of patented
technology to develop follow-on innovation and contributed to the
industry structure discussed below in Part II.B.3.
More recently, the Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the
patent exhaustion doctrine to patented seed in Bowman v. Monsanto.' 04
96. Pitcain v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. C1. 1976).
97. Id. at 1125-26.
98. Id. at. 1125-26.
99. Roche Products v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1984), supersededby
statute as recognized in Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
100. Id. at 863.
101. Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
102. Id. at 1352.
103. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
104. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S.Ct. 1761 (2013).
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In doing so, the Court weighed in on an ongoing ambiguity in the law
involving biological inventions, such as new kinds of seeds. Seeds
represented an issue' 0 5 because, unlike most inventions, they are selfreplicating. This self-replication makes copying of the invention
extremely easy 1°16. Furthermore, this intrinsic property of seeds
potentially limited patent protection through the doctrine of patent
exhaustion, which "provides that the initial authorized
sale of a patented
07
item terminates all patent rights to that item." 1
The Bowman case centered on the farmer Bowman's use of
Monsanto's Roundup Ready soybean seed.
These genetically
engineered seeds contain a gene that confers resistance to the herbicide
glyphosate.' 0 8 At the time of Bowman's use of the seed, Monsanto held
utility patents covering the gene and its use in crop plants, including
soybeans.' 0 9 Generally, an authorized purchase of seeds covered by
these Monsanto patents would include licensing terms that forbid saving
produced seed for replanting purposes. "10 However, Bowman purchased
"commodity" seed from a grain elevator that was intended for human or
animal consumption. 1" By obtaining seed in this manner, Bowman
avoided any licensing terms, which would have prevented him from
saving seed for replanting. Due to the extreme prevalence of Roundup
Ready soybean seed in the market, Bowman was able to treat the crop
from this commodity seed with the herbicide glyphosate without killing
the soybean plants."l 2 Bowman3 saved the resulting soybean seed from
this crop for future replanting. "
The Supreme Court found that, by planting the commodity seeds and
harvesting seed from the resulting soybean plants, Bowman had
"reproduced Monsanto's patented invention." ' 1 4 The Court held that
though Bowman could have used the purchased commodity seed as feed
or even resell it, using it to produce more seed was not protected by the
patent exhaustion doctrine.
The Court was not swayed by Bowman's
argument that patent exhaustion should apply because the seeds are
meant to be planted and replicated, finding instead that "[t]he exhaustion

105. Id. at 1768-69
106. Id.
107. Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG Elec. Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008).
108. Id. at 1764.

109. Id. See also U.S. Patent Nos. 5,352,605 and RE39,247E.
110. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1764-65.
111. Id. at 1765.
112. Id.

113. Id.
114. Id. at 1767.
115. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766.
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doctrine is limited to the 'particular item' sold". 16 Therefore, Bowman
could use the seeds he purchased but could not copy them despite their
inherently self-replicating nature. The Bowman decision strengthened
patent protections surrounding GE crops by disallowing a line of
arguments that would have reinvigorated seed saving among farmers to
the detriment of GE crop seed sales.
In Ass 'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., however,
the Supreme Court narrowed intellectual property protection for GE
organisms. 117 Myriad addressed whether isolated DNA sequences of
naturally occurring genes were patentable subject matter. The Court
held that merely isolating genes that are found in nature does not make
them patentable subject matter. 118 However, the Court also found that
cDNA, the creation of which is a minor and routine laboratory alteration
of a gene's sequence, was patentable subject matter. 119 This holding
suggests that relatively minor alterations to otherwise naturally
occurrin genes may allow those genes to be patentable subject
matter. 12
GE crops rely on the identification and transfer of genes for specific
traits of interest. 121 Companies seeking patent protection for GE crops
file patents on the plant as well as the gene for the traits of interest.
Therefore, Myriad necessarily limits some of the patent protections
available within the agricultural biotechnology industry.
For the agricultural biotechnology industry, these cases help to
delineate the metes and bounds of patent protection within the industry.
Roche limited the ability of competitors to begin to work on competitive
products using patented gene traits until the patents expire. Bowman
effectively banned any remnant of seed saving left from farmers'
historical practices. On the other hand, Myriad prevents claims directed
specifically at naturally occurring genes which may allow for traits to
remain in the public domain. However, Myriad left open the possibility
of claiming genes with laboratory-altered sequences and the transgenic
organisms themselves.

116. Id.at 1767.
117. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013).
118. Id.at 2117-18.
119. Id.at 2119.
120. While cDNA passes the threshold requirement for patentable subject matter, the other
requirements for obtaining a patent-novelty, non-obviousness and utility-still apply. Given the
routine nature of cDNA conversion in modem laboratories, it is unclear that cDNA will continue to
remain non-obvious in the eye of the USPTO.
121. See supra Part II.A.3.
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3. Impact of Intellectual Property Law on Industry Structure
Coinciding with increased intellectual property protection and
transgenic technology were major alterations in the structure of the
agricultural seed-production industry. 12 2 Over the last four decades, the
industry shifted from one with a plethora of small, regional seed
producers to an industry dominated by a small number of large,
multinational corporations. 123 The seed industry is dominated by six
large seed and chemical companies, with the largest three (Monsanto,
24
Syngenta, and DuPont) controlling approximately half of the market. 1
This oligopolistic structure has resulted from rapid consolidation within
the industry, with large corporations acquiring the majority of the small
and mid-sized firms within the industry.
Strong intellectual property protections on bag-seed licenses and
patent cross-licensing agreements among the dominant seed-producing
corporations have served to maintain this structure by enhancing barriers
to entry for smaller firms. 12 6 In the absence of a common law
experimental use exception or application of the statutory experimental
use exception, small companies that wish to develop GE crops with
patented traits have been forced to negotiate with the large corporations
for patent licenses. 127 These negotiations are required even if the
resulting GE crops would not be ready for market until after the patent
protection covering the underlying trait or crop had expired.
Not everyone is confident that the existing industry structure, based
on such strong patent protections, is in the best interest of innovation orsociety. 128 In 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice instigated a two-year

122. Rowe, supranote 57, at 860.
123. Phillip H. Howard, Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry: 1996-2008, 1
SUSTAINABILITY 1266, 1266-87 (2009); Jay P. Kesan, Seeds of Change: A Link Among the Legal,
Economic and AgriculturalCommunities, xvii, xxii, in SEEDS OF CHANGE, supranote 79.
124. Howard, supra note 123, at 1274-79.
125. Id.
126. Andrew Pollack, Monsanto and DuPont Settle Fight Over Patent Licensing, N.Y. TIMES
(MARCH 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/business/monsanto-and-dupont-settle-fightover-roundup-ready-technology.html?_-r0; Elizabeth I. Winston, What Ifs and Other Alternative
IntellectualPropertyand Cyberlaw Story: If Seeds Were Not Patentable?,2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 321,
330 (2008); Rowe, supra note 57, at 866; Jay P. Kesan, Licensing Restrictions and Appropriating
Market Benefits from Plant Innovation, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1081, 1084
(2006).
127. See Monsanto Licensing Allows Farmers to Buy Traitsfrom Folks They Know, DELTA FARM
PRESS (Oct. 19, 2001), http://deltafarmpress.com/monsanto-licensing-allows-growers-buy-traits-folksthey-know.
128. For a detailed argument that the industry structure is procompetitive, see F. Scott Kieff et al.,
Comment on Intellectual Property, Concentration and the Limits of Antitrust in the Biotech Seed
Industry (Lewis & Clark Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010-9; Geo. Mason Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 10-24), http://ssm.com/abstract-1553064.
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antitrust investigation into Monsanto business practices due to the
economic concentration of the industry.12 9 At least one scholar has
classified these barriers to entry as intellectual property overreaching
because they do not leave room for experimentation during the patent
term. 130 Similarly, Professor Mark Janis has suggested that the use of an
experimental use exception would open the industry for sustainable
agriculture. 13 1 The application of the statutory experimental use

exception would alleviate some of the concerns expressed by the DOJ
and scholars and perhaps reshape the industry, as discussed in Part VI.
These strong intellectual property protections, however, do not act in a

vacuum. Rather, combined with complicated regulatory barriers, these
constraints serve to keep the number of industry players small.
C. U.S. FederalFoodRegulation

Federal food regulation in the U.S. began over a century ago with an
emphasis on prevention of misbranding and adulteration of
foodstuffs. 132 Over time this regulatory structure expanded, resulting in

a mosaic of" 15 [federal] agencies that collectively administer at least 30
laws related to food safety."' 33 Primary among these agencies is the
FDA, which is responsible for the regulation of most foods except
poultry, meat, and some egg products, which are regulated by the
USDA. 134
The FDA derives most of its power for food safety regulation from
the federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 135

The FDCA does

not provide authority for premarket approval of whole foods, such as
fruits and vegetables, though the FDA has the ability to remove foods
from the market if they are "adulterated"'' 36 or "misbranded."' 137 Under

129. Ian Berry & David Kesmodel, U.S. Closes Antitrust Investigation Into Seed Industry,
Monsanto,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Nov.
16,
2012,
7:18
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBI0001424127887324735104578123631878019070.
130. Rowe, supra note 57, at 874.
13 1. Mark Janis, SustainableAgriculture, PatentRights, and PlantInnovation, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUDIES 91, 105, 106-08 (2001) [hereinafter Janis, SustainableAgriculture].
132. For a short overview of early federal food and medicine regulation leading to the modem
FDA, see FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FDA's ORIGIN AND FUNCTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/default.htm (last visited
Sept. 14, 2015).
133. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-435T, FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FOOD SAFETY 3
(2008).
134. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-290, HIGH RISK SERIES 262 (2015).
135. 21 U.S.C. § 301.
136. The FDCA definition of an adulterated foods is found at 21 U.S.C. § 342 and generally
indicates an unsafe, unwholesome, or impure food.
137. The FDCA definition of misbranded foods is found at 21 U.S.C. § 343.
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the FDCA, however, the FDA does have premarket authority in the
regulation of food additives.
1. Food Additive Regulations
The 1958 Food Additives Amendment gave the FDA more authority
to examine the safety of food additives.' 38 Currently, there are about
3,000 listed food additives including common additives such as salt and
sugar." 139 Under the FDCA, a food additive is
any substance the intended use of which results or may
reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in
its becoming a component or otherwise affecting the
characteristics of any food ... if such substance is not
generally recognized, among experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety,
as having been adequately shown through scientific
procedures . .. to be safe under the conditions of its
intended use ...140
Therefore, a substance added to food that is generally recognized as
safe (GRAS) is, by the FDCA's definition, not a "food additive."
Congress prohibits the "adulteration or misbranding of any food,
4
drug, device, tobacco product, or cosmetic in interstate commerce.""11
A food is "adulterated" if it contains "any food additive that is unsafe
within the meaning of section 348[,] ' ' 142 and courts have held
accordingly. 43 Anyone, including the FDA, 144 can file a petition
regarding an intended use of a food additive that proposes a regulation
outlining how a particular food additive may be used. 145 These petitions
and the factors used to determine safety are exhaustive and require a
huge amount of data.
The petition has several requirements. First, the petition must include
"the name and all pertinent information concerning such food additive,
138. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, codified at 21 U.S.C. 321(s) (defining food additive);
21 U.S.C. 348(a) (defining unsafe food additive); section 409(b)-(h) (establishing a premarket approval
process); 21 U.S.C. 342(a)(2)(C) (amending the food adulteration provisions).
U.S.

139. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, OVERVIEW OF FOOD INGREDIENTS, ADDITIVES & COLORS,
DEP'T
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,

http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/FoodAdditiveslngredients/ucmO94211 .htm
(last visited Nov. 11, 2015) [hereinafter "FDA Food Additives"].
140. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s).
141. Id. § 331.
142. Id. § 342 (a)(2)(C)(i).
143. See, e.g.,
United States v.Ewig Bros. Co., Inc., 502 F.2d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Articles of Food... Buffalo Jerky, 456 F. Supp. 207, 209 (D. Neb. 1978).
144. 21 U.S.C. § 348(d).
145. Id. § 348(b)(1).
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including, where available, its chemical identity and composition."' 146
The petition shall also include "a statement of the conditions of the
proposed use of such additive... 147 including directions for the use of
the additive, and examples of the proposed labeling. 148 Additionally,
"all relevant data bearing on the physical or other technical effect such
additive is intended to produce, and the quantity of such additive
49
required to produce such effect" must be included. 1
Other petition requirements include "a description of practicable
methods for determining the quantity of such food additive in or on
food, and any substance formed in or on food, because of its use" and
full investigative reports regarding the safety of the additive. 150 These
investigative reports should include all "information as to the methods
and controls" employed in the investigations. 151
Further, in the event that all of the enumerated requirements do not
expressly require a certain group of information, § 348 contains a
"catch-all" provision of sorts.
Preceding all of the discussed
requirements, § 348 states that the petition shall contain "any
explanatory or supporting data."' 152 Even more, the petitioner is required
to give a "full description of the methods used in, and the facilities and
controls used for, the production of such additive" and to provide
"samples of the food additive involved, or articles used as components
[of the food additive] and of the food in or on which the additive is
proposed to be used" if the Secretary requests such information or
samples. 153
Once the petition is filed, it is reviewed by the FDA. The FDCA sets
forth a non-exhaustive list of factors that the FDA should consider when
determining whether a proposed food additive is safe. The FDA should
consider (1) "the probable consumption of the additive and any
154
substance formed in or on food because of the use of the additive;"'
(2) "the cumulative effect of such additive in the diet of man or animals,
taking into account any chemically or pharmacologically related
substance or substances in such diet;"' 155 and (3) "safety factors which in
the opinion of experts qualified by scientific training and experience to
evaluate the safety of food additives are generally recognized as
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. § 348(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 348(b)(2)(B).
Id.
21 U.S.C. § 348(b)(2)(C).
Id. § 348(b)(2)(D)-(E).
Id.
Id. § 348(b)(2).
Id. § 348(b)(3)-(4).
21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(5)(A).
Id. § 348(c)(5)(B).
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appropriate for the use of animal experimentation data."' 156 The FDA
website adds that it will also consider "various safety factors."' 15 7 The
FDA may also establish tolerance limits-i.e.,58limits on how much an
additive may be used in order to assure safety. 1
2. Additives "Generally Recognized as Safe"
As noted above, under the
not actually a food additive
safety can be established by
"common use in food prior

FDCA, a substance that is added to food is
if it is GRAS. 1 59 General recognition of
either scientific studies and evidence' 60 or
to January 1, 1958. " 16 1 However, where
recognition of safety is based on scientific evidence there must be "the
same quantity and quality of scientific evidence as is required to obtain
62
[premarket] approval of a food additive regulation for the ingredient." 1
Additionally, any scientific procedures used to demonstrate recognition
of safety shall "ordinarily be based upon published studies which may
163
be corroborated by unpublished studies and other data. ...,,
The FDA has published a list of substances and their specified
purposes that the agency has found to be GRAS. 16 4 However, this list is
not exhaustive, 165 and in recent decades, the FDA has relied almost
exclusively on companies themselves to make determinations as to
whether a substance is GRAS. The FDA has stopped affirming GRAS
status of substances and instead encourages the submission of a GRAS
notification by companies,66which the FDA can then respond to with any
concerns the agency has. 1
D. Regulation of Biotechnology: The CoordinatedFramework
The regulatory scheme directed towards the safety of biotechnology
156. Id. § 348(c)(5)(C).
157. FDA Food Additives, supra note 139.
158. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(4).
159. Id. § 321(s)
160. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(b).
161. Id. § 170.30(c)(1)-(2).
162. Id. § 170.30(b).
163. Id.
164. 21 C.F.R § 184.
165. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, STATEMENT OF POLICY: FOODS DERIVED FROM NEW
PLANT
VARIETIES,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
HEALTH
AND
HUMAN
SERVS.,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatorylnformation/Biotechnolo
gy/ucm096095.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2015) [hereinafter "1992 Statement of Policy"].
166. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, How U.S. FDA'S GRAS NOTIFICATION PROGRAM
WORKS,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,
(Dec.
2005/Jan.
2006),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/GRAS/ucm083022.htm.
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and its products, including food products and pesticides, is known as the
Coordinated Framework. 167 The Coordinated Framework rests on the
underlying premise that biotechnology can be adequately regulated
through existing laws and regulatory structures, though it was
recognized that some regulations and laws may have to adapt to rapidly
changing technologies. 68
Further, the Coordinated Framework
embodies the concept that genetically engineered products and
organisms are not fundamentally different than those created by more
traditional means such as selective breeding and induced mutation, and
thus the agencies generally assess risk according
to the individual
69
product rather than the process used to create it.'
For regulation of biotechnologically derived foods and food products
such as GE crops, the Coordinated Framework relies primarily on three
agencies: the FDA, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). 70 A single product is often regulated by
more than one agency and each agency operates under different, though
sometimes overlapping, statutory authority. In the realm of agricultural
biotechnology, the USDA-APHIS protects U.S. agriculture by
regulating plant pests, diseases, and weeds via the Plant Protection
Act. 171 The EPA protects human health and the environment through
regulation of pesticides and plant-incorporated protectants 172 with the
Pesticide Registration and Classification system and experimental use
permits 174 under authority of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the FDCA. The EPA also controls
reporting review processes for intergeneric microorganisms pursuant to
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). 175 The FDA protects the
safety of76the food and feed supply, primarily under the authority of the
FDCA. 1
As stated previously, the USDA-APHIS is generally concerned with
167. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26,
1986) [hereinafter OSTP 1986]. For a full description of the Coordinated Framework, see PEW
INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, PEW, GUIDE TO U.S. REGULATION OF GENETICALLY
MODIFIED
FOOD
AND
AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY
PRODUCTS
(2004),

http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/food_andbiotechnol
ogy/hhsbiotech09O pdf.pdf [hereinafter PEW].
168. OSTP 1986, supra 167, at 3-4.
169. Id.
170. For an overview of the Coordinated Framework, see PEW, supra note 167.
171. 7 U.S.C. § 7701 and 7 C.F.R. § 340.0-.9 (2013).
172. Such as Bt.
173. 40 C.F.R. § 152, 174 (2013).
174. Id.§ 172.
175. Id.§ 725.
176. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 301.
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plant pests and diseases, working to prevent the release and spread of
these agriculturally damaging agents. 177 USDA-APHIS regulates field

tests and interstate shipping of most genetically engineered plants, and
GE plants are considered to be "regulated articles" until a petition for
deregulation is approved by the agency. 178 However, in the majority of

situations the applicant needs only submit a notification to the USDAAPHIS before a field test or interstate shipment of a regulated article is
performed. 179 The agency must
then respond with an acknowledgement
80

or denial of the notification. 1
Under USDA-APHIS

regulations, a "regulated article" is "any

organism which has been altered or produced through genetic
engineering, if the donor organism, recipient organism, or vector or
vector agent" is known or believed to be a plant pest or if the
classification of the organism is unknown.' 81 A "plant pest" is also
extremely broadly defined as nearly any organism that can cause

damage to a plant or a part of a plant. 182 Currently, most genetic
engineering methods for plants make use of organisms currently
classified as plant pests, and so most GE plants come under USDAAPHIS regulation.' 83 These definitions of a regulated article and plant

pest gives the USDA-APHIS wide latitude in regulating initial transport
and release into the environment of GE organisms, though the applicant
can petition for deregulation with a showing of data of the effects of the
GE organism84 on other plants, non-target organisms, and the
environment. 1
As stated above, the EPA's authority to regulate agricultural
biotechnology is derived from the FIFRA, the FDCA, and the TSCA.
Under FIFRA, the EPA regulates the use of pesticides. 1 85 Substances
177. See supraPart I.DI.
178. 7 C.F.R. § 340.3.
179. Id.
180. 7 C.F.R. 340.3(d).
181. Id. § 340.1.
182. Id.
183. The first generations of genetically engineered plants often used transformation techniques
(methods of moving the foreign DNA into the target plant cells), which relied on vectors such as
Agrobacterium tumefaciens that are considered by USDA-APHIS to be plant pests. See Charles S.
Gasser and Robert T. Fraley, Genetically Engineering Plantsfor Crop Improvement, 244 Sci. 1293,
1293 (1989). Newer methods of creating GE plants may not rely on known or suspected plant pests for
transformation and so would not come under USDA-APHIS regulation. In 2011, USDA-APHIS
confirmed that a GE Kentucky Bluegrass from Scott's Miracle-Gro Company did not come under its
regulation, as the "organisms used in generating Scotts' variety of GE Kentucky bluegrass are not
considered to be plant pests, and Scotts did not use a plant pest to genetically engineer the Kentucky
bluegrass."

See

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

AGRICULTURE,

NEWS

RELEASE

(July

1

2011),

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/2011/07/kentucky-.bluegrass.shtml.
184. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(c).
185. Pesticide is a broad term meaning:
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falling under this definition of pesticide must be registered with the EPA
before distribution or sale. 186 For registration to be successful, the
substance must not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment"' 187 when used as intended or as is common practice.188
Importantly for agricultural biotechnology, the EPA also regulates
pesticides expressed by GE plants themselves (known as "plantincorporated protectants"), such as crops expressing the Bt pesticide.
The EPA is also responsible for regulating and establishing
tolerance
89
levels for pesticide residues in foods under the FDCA. 1
The FDA, the third agency in the Coordinated Framework, concerns
its regulations with the safety of agricultural biotechnology for
consumption. 19° Due to the language and caselaw' 9 1 surrounding the
statutory experimental use exception, this Article focuses on those FDA

regulations.
In 1992, the FDA published a policy (1992 Statement of Policy) that
"clarified the agency's interpretation of the application of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with respect to human foods and animal

feeds derived from new plant varieties and provided guidance ' to
92
industry on scientific and regulatory issues related to these foods."'
This policy "applied to all foods derived from all new plant varieties,
including varieties that are developed using recombinant
deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA) technology." 193 It basically provided
that
94
GE foods would be regulated as food additives under the Act. 1

(1) any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or
mitigating any pest, (2) any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant
regulator, defoliant, or desiccant, and (3) any nitrogen stabilizer, except that the term
"pesticide" shall not include any article that is a "new animal drug ....
7 U.S.C. 136(u).
186. Id. § 136a (a).
187. These "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" include:
(1) any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic,
social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide, or (2) a human
dietary risk from residues that result from a use of a pesticide in or on any food inconsistent
with the standard under section 346a of title 21. The Administrator shall consider the risks
and benefits of public health pesticides separate from the risks and benefits of other
pesticides. In weighing any regulatory action concerning a public health pesticide under this
subchapter, the Administrator shall weigh any risks of the pesticide against the health risks
such as the diseases transmitted by the vector to be controlled by the pesticide.
Id. § 136(bb).
188. Id. § 136a(c)(5)
189. 21 U.S.C. 346(a), 348.
190. See PEw, supranote167.
191. See infra Part IV.
192. 1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 165.
193. Id.
194. GE crops are one type. GE animals for food consumption would be the other.
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1. Regulation as Food Additives
In its 1992 Statement of Policy, the FDA did not create a new
regulatory framework for GE crops and their food products. Instead, the
FDA provided that "fruits, vegetables, grains, and their byproducts,
derived from plant varieties developed by... new methods of genetic
modification are regulated within the existing framework of the [Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act]. '195 The FDA rationalized that this was the
appropriate position because "[t]he regulatory status" of food is not
dependent upon the method by which it is derived. 196 The "key factors
in reviewing safety concerns should be the characteristics of the food
product .... 197 Accordingly, the FDA stated that GE foods would be
regulated as food additives under § 402(a)(1) and § 409 of the FDCA. 198
According to the 1992 Statement of Policy, § 402(a)(1) applies to any
"substance that occurs unexpectedly in the food at a level that may be
injurious to health ... includ[ing] a naturally occurring toxicant whose
level is unintentionally increased by the genetic modification .... 99
Moreover, the 1992 Statement of Policy places the burden on the
producer of a new food to evaluate and determine safety and compliance
with § 402(a)(1) of the FDCA.2 °°
Section 409 of the FDCA "broadly encompasses any substance that
has an intended use in food, unless the substance is [generally
recognized as safe]." ' '
The FDA felt that § 409's broad scope
indicated that the regulatory scheme in place would be sufficient to
cover genetic material that is transferred.20 2 Therefore, "in the case of
foods derived from new plant varieties, it is the transferred genetic
material and the intended expression product[s] ... that could be subject
203
to food additive regulation" if the genetic material is not GRAS.
Thus, not all genetic materials would be evaluated under § 409. For
example, nucleic acids would not be subject to food additive regulation
because they "are present in the cells of every living organism," and
therefore, are "presumed to be [generally recognized as safe]. 20 4

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 165.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at § V.B.
1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 165.
Id. at § V.C.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2. FDA Guidance on Regulatory Compliance
The FDA's 1992 Statement of Policy then set forth some guidance to
the industry regarding foods that are derived from GE crops. The
guidance is based around the idea that the "FDA believes that a
scientific basis should exist to establish that new plant varieties do not
exhibit unacceptable effects with respect to toxicants, nutritional value,
or allergens." 2 °5 Moreover, the 1992 Statement of Policy set forth an
"assessment scheme [that] focuses on characteristics of the new plant
variety,... characteristics of the host and donor species, the nature of

the genetic change, the identity and function of newly introduced
substances, and unexpected or unintended effects that accompany the
genetic change.

2 °6

As a general matter, the FDA then provides five major assessment
considerations: (1) toxicants known to be characteristic of the host and
donor species; (2) the potential that food allergens will be transferred
from one food source to another; (3) the concentration and
bioavailability of important nutrients for which a food crop is ordinarily
consumed; (4) the safety and nutritional value of newly introduced
proteins; and (5) the identity, composition, and nutritional value of
modified carbohydrates, or fats and oils. 20 7 Importantly, these are
general considerations. The FDA also set forth specific, but similar,
considerations for the safety assessment of the host plant,208 the donor
plant,20 9 substances introduced
into the host plant from the donor
2 0 and toxicology. 211
plant,
3. FDA-Developer Consultations
Since the 1992 Statement of Policy was issued, the FDA has
encouraged developers to consult with the FDA regarding the
development and marketing of new bioengineered products. These
interactions take three forms: (1) biotechnology final consultations; (2)
new protein consultations; and (3) establishment of a food master file or
submission of a food additive petition.
In 2001, the FDA issued a proposed rule providing that "developers
submit a scientific and regulatory assessment of the bioengineered food
205. 1992 Statement of Policy, supranote 165.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See id. at § VI.D.
209. See id. at § VI.E.
210. See 1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 165, at § VI.F. This category includes proteins,
carbohydrates, fats, and oils.
211. Seeid. at § VI.G.
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120 days before the bioengineered food is marketed., 2 12 The FDA also
encourages developers to consult with the FDA before issuing a
premarket notice. 2 During a final biotechnology consultation with the
FDA, "a developer... may meet with the agency to identify and discuss
relevant safety, nutritional, or other regulatory issues regarding the
bioengineered food in an initial consultation." 21 4
However, the
developer may forgo the consultation and simply "submit to 2FDA
a
15
summary of its scientific and regulatory assessment of the food.,
New Protein Consultations (NPCs) and its corresponding documents
were created to decrease the possibility that "new bioengineered plants
could result in the inadvertent, intermittent, low-level presence in the
food supply of proteins that that have not been evaluated through FDA's
biotechnology consultation process. 2 16 As NPCs take place, the FDA
keeps and manages an inventory of completed NPCs. 217 This inventory
218
includes the agency's response and the developer's actual submission.
The third category of submissions-food master files and petitionsare rare, and the FDA keeps an inventory of these as well. 219 A food
petition and its corresponding master file of data is required only if the
additive is not already regulated for the intended use.2 2 °
While the FDA has developed this extensive structure of
consultations for GE crops, compliance is, from a legal standpoint,
voluntary.221
Since GE crops generally are considered GRAS,
companies are free to declare the GE crop GRAS internally and market
the seeds. Such internal GRAS declarations are quite common in the
chemical food-additive space.22 2
However, in the agricultural
biotechnology industry, opting out of the voluntary process is quite rare.
By the account of at least one former USDA official, all GE crops that

U.S.

212. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, SUBMISSIONS ON BIOENGINEERED NEW PLANT VARIETIES,
DEP'T
OF
HEALTH
AND
HUMAN
SERVS.,

http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/GEPlants/Submissions/default.htm (last visited June 2,
2016) [hereinafter "Submissions on Bioengineered Varieties"].
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Submissions on Bioengineered Varieties, supra note 212.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
ABOUT
THE
PETITION
PROCESS,
DEP'T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,

http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsReguatorylnformation/ucm253328.
htm#answerA (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).
221. PEW, supra note 167, at 20.
222. Tom Neltner & Maricel Maffini, Generally Recognized as Secret: Chemicals Added to Food
in
the
United
States,
NAT.
RESOURCES
DEF.
COUNCIL
(Apr.
2014),
http://www.nrdc.org/food/files/safety-loophole-for-chemicals-in-food-report.pdf.
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have gone through the mandatory USDA-APHIS review also have gone
through the FDA voluntary process.223
The context of the current contours of patent protection, industry
structure, and the Coordinated Framework discussed above sets the
stage for the analysis of the applicability of the statutory experimental
use exception-an analysis based on FDA regulation. However, in
order to consider the statutory experimental use exception, it is first
necessary to understand the broad regulations of products in the health
care industry and the development of abbreviated pathways of approval
once patent protection has expired.
III. DEVELOPMENT AND

REGULATION OF THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

Over time, the healthcare industry has evolved alongside the
agriculture industry.
Increased regulatory structure and patent
protection have produced two dynamic, sophisticated industries similar
in many ways. Like the agriculture industry, the pharmaceutical
industry is focused on proprietary products that can be ushered through
a regulatory process. However, patents have been explicitly directed at
chemical drugs longer than plants. Therefore, consumers have come to
expect cheaper, non-patent protected, generic versions of drugs to
become available as patents on drugs expire.
As patents prohibit new entrants into a product marketplace until after
expiration, consumers became concerned with the delay of entry of
cheaper generics, especially with patent extensions being granted for
delays in regulatory approval. In response, Congress developed an
abbreviated approval pathway for generic drugs.2 24 This abbreviated
pathway includes the statutory experimental use exception that is
potentially applicable to the agricultural biotechnology industry.
A. Development andRegulation of New Drugs

While an article is not deemed a "drug" under the FDA merely by
labeling it a drug, the FDA's definition of drug is broad, encompassing
four large categories of drugs. The first is any article "recognized in the
official United States Pharmacopceia, official Homoeopathic
Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or
'
any supplement to any of them."225
The second is any article "intended
223. Nathanael Johnson, The GM safety dance: What's rule and what's real, GRIST (July 10,
2013), http://grist.org/food/the-gm-safety-dance-whats-rule-and-whats-real/.
224. See infra Part IIB.
225. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(A) (1923).
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for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease in man or other animals. 2 26 The third is any article, other than
food, "intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of
man or other animals., 227 The fourth is any article "intended for use as a
component of any article specified in" the previous categories.228
The regulation of drugs has evolved over time. Pre-Civil War, the
only drug regulations involved protections against the importation of
adulterated and misbranded drugs.229 It wasn't until the passage of the

1902 Pure Food and Drug Act that Congress acted to regulate the
interstate commerce of adulterated or misbranded domestic drugs.230
This Act also established the United States Pharmacopceia and National
Formulary as the standard listings for approved drugs. 231 A series of
deaths from untested drug formulations led to the passage of the FDCA
of 1938, which established the requirement that companies prove the
safety of any drug before it was marketed.232 In 1962, Congress
amended the FDCA to additionally require companies
to submit proof of
233
the drug's efficacy for the marketed indication.
1. FDA Approval Process for New Drugs
The regulatory process for FDA approval of new drugs is relatively
straightforward but extremely expensive. The drug approval process
begins with the company testing the new drug on animals. 234 The
purpose of this animal testing is to determine how the drug reacts and if

226. Id. § 321(g)(1)(B).
227. Id. § 321(g)(1)(C).
228. Id. § 321(g)(1)(D).
229. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, BROCHURE: THE HISTORY OF DRUG REGULATION IN THE
UNITED
STATES,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,

http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatweDo/History/FOrgsHistory/CDER/CenterforDrugEvaluationand
ResearchBrochureandChronology/ucm I14470.htm (last visited June 2, 2016) [hereinafter "Brochure"].
230. SUZANNE WHITE JUNOD, FDA AND CLINICAL DRUG TRIALS: A SHORT HISTORY, FOOD &
DRUG

ADMINISTRATION,

http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm304485.htm
2015).
231. Brochure, supra note 229.

(last visited July 25,

232. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FDA'S ORIGIN AND FUNCTIONS - PART II: THE 1938
FOOD,
DRUG,
AND
COSMETIC
ACT,
DEP'T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,

http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054826.htm (last visited June 2, 2016).
233. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FDA HISTORY - PART IV: REGULATING COSMETICS,
DEVICES, AND VETERINARY MEDICINE AFTER 1938, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.

http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDAJWhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm055137.htm (last visited June 2, 2016).
U.S.

234. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, How FDA EVALUATES REGULATED PRODUCTS: DRUGS,
DEP'T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,

http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm269834.htm
[hereinafter "FDA Drug Regulation"].

(last visited June

2,

2016)
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the drug is safe enough to be tested on humans.235 Once the animal
testing is complete, the company must submit and get approved an
Investigational New Drug Application (IND) to the FDA before any
testing on humans can be conducted.2 36 When the FDA approves the

IND, the company will then conduct testing of the drug on humans in
clinical trials to determine the safety and efficacy of the drug.237 The
company will then compile the data that it collects from the threephased clinical trials and submit it to the FDA's Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research (CDER) as part of its New Drug Application
(NDA) 8 The NDA, along with its included data and proposed
labeling, will then be evaluated by the CDER team.239 If a drug's
proposed benefits outweigh its known risks, the drug will be approved
for sale. 240 The cost of the approval process becomes apparent with the
details of the approval process.
After animal testing indicates that a drug has a likelihood of success
for use in humans, pharmaceutical companies must begin clinical trial
testing in humans. Clinical trials occur in three basic stages. In Phase I
of clinical trials, small groups of volunteers are given dosages of drugs
in safety studies. The goal of a Phase I clinical trial is to determine
initial drug safety, set a safe dosage range, and begin to identify
potential side effects. Phase I clinical trials do not include tests for the
efficacy of the drug. Phase II clinical trials involve a larger group of
people, continue to evaluate safety, and also begin to collect data on the
effectiveness of the drug. Phase III clinical trials are the final, most
costly stage of drug testing. Large numbers of volunteers are needed in
order to evaluate the drug's effectiveness and to monitor side effects.
Also, Phase III clinical trials often compare the drug's effectiveness to
commonly used treatments, if applicable, and collect information about
side effects and counter-indications that will allow the drug to be used

235. Id. An independent Institutional Review Board (IRB) also will review the application to
determine if human testing is appropriate. See FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE DRUG REVIEW
PROCESS

1,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

HEALTH

&

HUMAN

SERVS.,

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovaProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandAppro
ved/UCM 195671.pdf (last visited June 2, 2016) [hereinafter "Drug Review Process"].
236. FDA Drug Regulation, supra note 234.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
This team is usually comprised of "physicians, statisticians, toxicologists,
pharmacologists, chemists, and other scientists .
I..."
Id. If the CDER finds that the drug is unsafe and
the FDA does not approve the drug, it will communicate its concerns regarding the drug to the company.
Drug Review Process, supranote 235. The FDA, at this stage, also will evaluate and inspect the places
where the drug will be made and how it will be made. Id.
240. FDA Drug Regulation, supra note 234. The FDA, at this stage, has sixty days to decide to
approve and file an application or not. Drug Review Process, supra note 235.
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24 1

safely.
Upon completion of the clinical trials, the pharmaceutical company
still needs FDA approval to market the drug. The FDCA states that
"[n]o person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate
commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed
pursuant to [FDCA provisions governing new drug applications or
abbreviated new drug applications] of this section is effective with
respect to such drug. 24 2 Therefore, the pharmaceutical company must
submit an NDA based on the results of the clinical trials.
Once the drug has been approved and is disseminated throughout the
market, the FDA will then continue to passively monitor the drug's
performance. 243 One way the FDA has indicated its surveillance is
through MedWatch, "the agency's safety information and adverse event
reporting program.",244 However, this program is voluntary, and even
the FDA notes that several serious adverse events go unreported. 245 The
FDA also conducts "postmarket requirement and commitment studies"
after it has approved a product for marketing.24 6 If the FDA ultimately
finds that a drug is unsafe once it has been released to the market, the
FDA can take several steps, including issuing a Drug Safety
Communication to consumers and healthcare professionals, adding a
warning statement to the drug, or withdrawing an approved drug from
the market. 247
2. Importance of Patents in Drug Development
As mentioned, these testing protocols and regulations are costly.
While the safety and efficacy requirements of the FDCA increase the
safety of U.S. consumers, they increase the cost of drug development.
Pharmaceutical companies on average invest millions of dollars into the
development of one new drug. 248 Additionally, approximately 90% of
241. U.S. NAT'L LIBR. OF MED., CLINICAL TRIAL PHASES, NAT'L INSTS.
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/ctphases.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2015).

OF HEALTH,

242. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1984).
243. FDA Drug Regulation, supra note 234.
244. Id.

245. Id.
246. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE FDA's DRUG REVIEW PROCESS: ENSURING DRUGS
ARE
SAFE
AND
EFFECTIVE,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143534.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2015)

[hereinafter "Drug Safety"].
247. FDA Drug Regulation, supra note 234.
248. This number is highly disputed. Some studies range from approximately one hundred
million to eight hundred million or more. MERRILL GOOZNER, $800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND
THE COST OF NEW DRUGS 239 (2004). But these studies often include capitalized costs of failed drug

leads as well as opportunity costs. Id. at 9-10.
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drugs in the clinical trial pipeline ultimately fail to gain FDA approvaloften after Phase III data is obtained.249
In order to recoup the cost of development and generate a profit,
pharmaceutical companies rely on patent protection for their approved
products. 250 A patent guarantees the pharmaceutical company a
monopoly for the life of the patent. These patents typically cover the
active ingredient of the drug but may also protect manufacturing
practices or specialized uses of the drug.251 These patented drugs are
often called "branded drugs" because the pharmaceutical companies
develop trademarked names for use in sales. For instance, the pain
reliever ibuprofen is sold by Pfizer as the branded drug Advil.252 Once
the patent expires, other pharmaceutical companies are able to sell a
drug previously covered by the patent. These formulations of the drug
sold in direct competition with the branded drug are called generic drugs
or just generics.
One consequence of the increased regulation of drugs and the
resulting increased cost of development is an increased cost for the drug
consumer. Pharmaceutical companies are able to command premium
prices for branded drugs initially due to the monopoly power granted by
the drug's patent. Once other companies enter the market selling the
same drug,
competition almost immediately drives down the price of the
253
drug.

B. Pathwayfor Generic Drugs and the Implementation of
Hatch-Waxman
Directly after the 1962 enactment of the FDCA, generic drug
companies had to submit the same amount of safety and efficacy data as
the branded drug company did in the initial filing. While generic
companies did not have to invest in research for drugs unlikely to be
approved, the cost of the clinical trials is enormous. As a result of the
cost of regulation of drugs combined with the low selling price of drugs
once competition began, generic drug manufacturers had little incentive
249. Michael Hay et al., Clinical development success ratesfor investigationaldrugs, 32 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 40,47 (2014).
250. Rebecca Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOM. TECH. L.
REV. 345, 350-52 (2007).
25 1. For case studies describing the multiple patents covering a drug, see Lisa L. Ouellette, How
Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug - Follow-On PharmaceuticalPatents and University
Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 320-21 (2010).
252. See Joanna Shepard, Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, and Barriers to Entry 6 (Emory Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 14-284).
253. Gerald Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug
Development Process,54 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999).
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to bring competing drug formulations to market. Additionally, due to
the patent protection, generic companies could not begin research on the
generic form of the drug until patent protection ended. The resulting
delay in approval of the generic often resulted
in years of de facto
254
monopoly for the branded drug manufacturer.
Concerns over the availability of cheap generics for consumers after
patent expiration led Congress to act. President Reagan signed the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act into law in 1984.255
The bill was sponsored in Congress by Congressmen Orrin Hatch and
Henry Waxman and is known more commonly today as the HatchWaxman Act.256
The Hatch-Waxman Act addressed the concerns over generic
availability by creating an abbreviated approval pathway by which
generic drug manufacturers could gain FDA approval. Under HatchWaxman, a generic company can file an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA).
The ANDA must include a certification
(1) there is no patent on the drug; 257
conditions:
four
of
indicating one
(2) the patent has expired; 258 (3) the date on which a patent will
expire; 259 or (4) that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, sale, or use of the new drug. 260 This certification
delineates the earliest that the ANDA can be approved. Certifications
under paragraphs 1 or 2 can be approved immediately while paragraph 3
certifications will be approved on the date the patent expires. Paragraph
4 certifications are essentially challenges to the validity of an existing
patent and require a response from the branded drug manufacturer and
potentially litigation before approval.
In addition to the ANDA itself, the generic drug manufacturer may
take advantage of the data submitted by the branded drug manufacturer
and submit only data to establish that the branded drug and the generic
drug to be marketed are bioequivalent. According to the FDA,
bioequivalency is defined as "the absence of a significant difference in
the rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in
pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes
available at the site of drug action when administered at the same molar

254.
255.
Stat. 1585
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. See also Eisenberg, Innovation Policy, supra note 250, at 357.
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
(1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).
Id.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(i) (1984).
Id. § 355(b)(2)(A)(ii).
Id. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iii).
Id. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv).
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dose under similar conditions in an appropriately designed study." 261
Chemical drugs tend to be small, low molecular weight compounds.
This class of drugs is synthesized using well-controlled and highly
reproducible reactions. As a result, the chemical compounds are
replicated easily once the manufacturing process becomes known.26 2

Under robust procedures, replication and production of highly pure
substances can be presumed to be identical to the originals. Therefore,
generic companies find it relatively cheap to conduct experiments
establishing bioequivalency as compared to conducting the full range of
required safety and efficacy studies.
Additionally, as a further incentive to file an ANDA, the first generic
company to file an ANDA for a given drug receives 180 days of generic
exclusivity before another ANDA can be filed. 263 This generic
exclusivity can be quite valuable to the generic manufacturer. 264 During
that 180 day period, the market for the drug contains only two
competitors-the branded drug and the initial generic. Therefore, the
generic manufacturer is able to obtain a premium over the generic price
that will be set once others move into the market.
Finally, the Hatch-Waxman Act amended existing patent law by
establishing a statutory experimental use exception to patent
infringement for research on drugs still covered by a patent.265 Prior to
1984, companies that conducted research on patented inventions, but did
not sell any infringing product, were thought to be exempt from patent
infringement liability under a common law experimental use exception
that traced its history from caselaw developed by Justice Story in
Whittemore v. Cutter.266 However, in 1984, in the case of Roche v.
Bolar, the Federal Circuit limited the use of the common law
experimental use exception to noncommercial uses. 26 7 Therefore,
generic drug companies were prevented from conducting
bioequivalency research using the patented drugs. In order to support
quicker access to drugs, the Hatch-Waxman Act implemented a
261. CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOAVAILABILITY AND BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDIES FOR ORALLY
(July
2002),
ADMINISTERED
DRUG
PRODUCTS
GENERAL
CONSIDERATIONS

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovaProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandAppro
ved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/UCM 154838.pdf.
262. Paul J. Declerck, Biologicals and Biosimilars:a review of the science and its implications, I
GENOMICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE J. 13, 13 (2012).

263. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
264. 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (1984); C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity:
Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch- Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 947 (2011).
265. 35 U.S.C § 271(e)(1) (1994).
266. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600)
267. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as recognized in Wamer-Lambert Co.
v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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statutory experimental use exception for generic drugs companies. As a
result, research to establish bioequivalency is not an infringement of the
patent covering the branded drug and can begin before the expiration of
the patent. In light of this, consumers often enjoy the benefit of generics
on the day that the patent expires.
IV. EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTORY EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION

The statutory experimental use exception as a defense to patent
infringement began as a mechanism for generic drug companies to
develop bioequivalency data for generic drug submissions before patent
expiration. However, it quickly evolved into a more generalized
research exception to patent infringement within the healthcare industry.
The application of the statutory experimental use exception beyond the
healthcare industry has not been addressed by either the Supreme Court
or the Federal Circuit.
A. The Statute and Its Initial Application
The language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) is the basis for the statutory
experimental use exception. The language reads:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer
to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the
United States a patented invention (other than a new
animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those
terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily
manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant
RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes
involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques)
solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture,268use, or sale of drugs
or veterinary biologicalproducts.
As should be immediately evident, the language of the statutory
experimental use exception is neither concise nor precise. In the words
of the Supreme Court, "No interpretation we have been able to imagine
can transform § 271(e)(1) into an elegant piece of statutory
draftsmanship. ' ' 269
The statute was initially read by the pharmaceutical industry such that
268 6 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (emphasis added).
269. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
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the language applied only to generic drug development. A "patented
invention" was assumed to be a branded, patented drug. The "Federal
Law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products" was interpreted as the provisions of the Food, Drug
and Cosmetics Act that cover the abbreviated approval process for
generic drugs. Finally, the use of the patented invention "solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information"
was understood to be the bioequivalency studies necessary for generic
approval.2 7 ° While these interpretations make sense in the context of the
development of the Hatch-Waxman Act of which the statute is a part,
the language itself is actually quite broad. These ambiguities in the
language of the statutory experimental use exception have led to a line
of cases interpreting those provisions once thought to be applicable only
to generic drugs.
B. Expansion of the Statutory Experimental Use Exception Beyond
Generic Drugs
The Supreme Court struck down this narrow interpretation of the
statutory experimental use exception in Eli Lilly. 27 1 Thereafter, the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit weighed in several times as to
the breadth of the application of the statutory experimental use
exception in patent infringement cases involving drug and nondrug
inventions.
1. Eli Lilly Expands the Statutory Experimental Use Exception
Eli Lilly sued Medtronic for patent infringement based on
Medtronic's use of Eli Lilly's patented technology to develop
Medtronic's own cardiac defibrillator. 272
Medtronic asserted the
statutory experimental use exception as a defense even though the
product that was being developed was a medical device rather than a
drug. 273 Medtronic based its assertion on the idea that the Federal law at
issue was the FDCA, albeit the provisions that regulate medical devices
rather than drugs.27 4

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See id. (arguments by made Eli Lilly).
Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 661.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 671.
Id.
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a. Medical Device Regulation
275
Like drugs, medical devices are also regulated under the FDCA;
however, the process is different from that of drugs in many ways.
Medical devices are separated into three classes, with the amount of
regulatory control increasing with each class-i.e., Class I medical
devices are subject to the least amount of regulation; Class II are subject
to more regulation; while Class III medical devices are subject to the
most amount of regulation. 76
Device classification is "risk-based" and "depends on the intended
use of the device and also upon indications for use. 27 7 The Supreme
Court has discussed the classification of devices.27 8 Class I devices are
those that pose the least risk, while Class III devices pose the greatest
risk.27 9 Specifically, Class I devices present no unreasonable risk of
illness or injury. 280 Examples of Class I devices include drainage
catheters, saliva absorbers, wheelchair accessories, x-ray alignment
devices, some dye and chemical solution stains, and liquid and elastic
bandages. 28' Class II devices are potentially more harmful.2 82 Some
Class II devices include automated platelet aggregation systems,
infusion pumps, blood access devices and accessories, tracheal tubes,
blood pressure alarms, and blood pressure CUffS. 2 8 3 Finally, Class III
devices either "present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury,"
or are "purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or
sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance in
preventing impairment of human health. 284 Class III devices include
external cardiac compressors, defibrillators, female condoms,

275. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994).
276. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, OVERVIEW OF DEVICE REGULATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,

http://www.fda.gov/MedicaiDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/overview/default.htm
June 2, 2016) [hereinafter "Device Regulation"].

(last visited

277. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, CLASSIFY YOUR MEDICAL DEVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,

http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/def
ault.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).

278. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996).
279. Id.
280. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (2006)).
281. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION DATABASE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,

http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpcd/classification.c fm?startsearch= 1&Submission
_Type_ID=&DeviceName=&ProductCode=&DeviceClass =1&ThirdParty&Panel=&RegulationNumb
er=&PAGENUM=500 (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) [hereinafter "Product Classification Database"].
282. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477.
283. PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION DATABASE, supra note 281.

284. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477 (citing § 360c(a)(1)(C)).
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intrauterine devices, and silicone and gel-filled breast prostheses.2 8 5
The FDA regulates medical devices with premarket notification and
approval processes. Typically, Class I devices are exempt from any
premarket requirements, whether it be notification or approval, instead
they are subject only to minimal regulation by "general controls. 28 6
Although Class II devices may be marketed without advance approval,
premarket notification is typically required.28 7
Class III devices
typically require premarket notification and approval. 288 Like drugs,
Class III devices must apply for an investigational device exemption,
which allows the devices to be used in order to collect data on safety and
effectiveness in humans in preparation for the premarket approval
application. Once approved, medical device reporting 290 mandates
reporting to the FDA any "[i]ncidents in which a medical device may
29 1
have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury.,
b. Eli Lilly Analysis
In analyzing the application of the statutory experimental use
exception to Class III medical devices, the Eli Lilly Court looked to
various terms within the statute. First, the Supreme Court declared that
"patented invention" applies to all types of inventions, not only drugrelated inventions.29 2 Thus, the statute potentially applies to any
patented invention that satisfies its other requirements. The Supreme
Court likely gave such a broad interpretation to the term "patented
invention" because of the other qualifying language in the statute
relating to the relevant law and types of submissions.
The Eli Lilly Court then identified what it viewed as a more
complicated issue; the interpretation of the phrase "a Federal Law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological
products." 293 Eli Lilly advocated for a narrow reading of the language
limited to those provisions of the FDCA that regulates drugs, but the
Supreme Court took a more expansive reading of the language, holding
that it points to the entire statutory scheme of the regulation
of the
29 4
FDCA rather than individual provisions regulating drugs.
285. PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION DATABASE, supra note 281.

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.
Device Regulation, supra note 276.
Id.
See generally 21 C.F.R. § 812 (2011).
See generally id.§ 803.
Device Regulation, supra note 276.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Metronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 666.
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In so holding, the Eli Lilly Court relied on both the language of the
statute as well as the potential intent of Congress to offset patent term
extensions granted due to delays in regulatory approval.295 For instance,
drugs, medical devices, food additives, and color additives are all
eligible for patent term extensions of up to five years if the product has
been "subject to a regulatory review period before its commercial
marketing or use," and the "the permission for the commercial
marketing or use of the product after such regulatory review period is
the first permitted commercial marketing or use of the product under the
provision of law under which such regulatory review period
occurred.

29 6

Balancing that extension, the Eli Lilly Court noted, was

the statutory experimental use exception that allowed competitors to
engage in otherwise infringing activities before the patent ended.29 7
The Eli Lilly Court acknowledged that some products would not
receive the extension but still suffer a loss in an infringement action,
however, the Court was not persuaded by this because it could not
"readily imagine such situations

. . .

except where there is good enough

difference.298

reason for the
The Court further asserted that the likely
reasons for a lack of extension would be a lack of an application for an
extension or a follow-on version of a drug for which the extension
would not apply. The Eli Lilly Court noted that all products eligible for
a patent term extension under § 156(a)-"medical devices, food
additives, color additives, new drugs, antibiotic drugs and human
biological products"-are subject to the statutory experimental use
exception because all of them "are subject to premarket approval under
various provisions of the FDCA.

2 99

The Eli Lilly Court further acknowledged that this broad reading of
invention, in conjunction with the interpretation of the statutory
experimental use exception to apply to all products regulated under any
provision of the FDCA, could result in a broad application of the
statutory experimental use exception. However, the Court further noted
a limitation on the application in that the use of the invention must be
"reasonably related to the development and submission of information
under" the FDCA.3 °°
Not all products eligible for a patent extension require submission of

295. Id. at 666, 672.
296. 35 U.S.C 156(a) (2006).
297. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 672.
298. Id. It should be noted that the Eli Lilly opinion was issued in 1990, two years before the
memo regarding the FDA's regulatory scheme for GE crops. The Supreme Court could not have
foreseen that regulatory schema at the time of the opinion.
299. Id. at 674.
300. Id. at 683 n. 6.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

43

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84

data under the FDCA. Producers of food and cosmetics do not need to
develop and submit information to the FDA but merely meet "generally
applicable standards." 30 1 On the other hand, once Congress established
a premarket approval requirement for infant formula, it was
"automatically rendered" eligible for the statutory experimental use
exception even though formula initially only needed to meet a set of
standards. 30 2 This distinction implies that foods would not receive the
benefit of the statutory experimental use exception because there are no
regulatory submissions to the FDA. However, it is unclear where food
additives designated as GRAS, such as GE crops, would fall on this
spectrum of regulation.
While its decision greatly expanded the application of the statutory
experimental use exception, the Eli Lilly Court left open a couple of
questions pertinent to a determination of its application to GE crops.
First, the Court did not explicitly state whether a product need be subject
to § 156(a) premarket approval in order for the statutory experimental
use exception to apply. Second, the definition of "reasonably related to
the development and submission of information" was left open for
further development.
2. No Need for Premarket Approval Under § 156(a) to Qualify for the
Statutory Experimental Use Exception
While the Eli Lilly Court used very broad language in expanding the
application of the statutory experimental use exception, it used much
narrower reasoning to support broadening the experimental use
exception beyond drugs. This narrow reasoning implied that inventions
not subject to § 156(a) might not be subject to the statutory experimental
use exception.
In Abtox v. Exitron,30 3 the Federal Circuit tackled the issue of whether
the statutory experimental use exception applied to devices not covered
under § 156(a).3 °4 Prior to Abtox, district courts had applied the
statutory experimental use exception only to Class III devices, since
Class I and Class II devices are not subject to § 156(a).3 °5
In Abtox, the patent covered a device used to sterilize medical
instruments. Sterilization instruments are considered Class II medical

301.
302.
303.
reh 'g, 131
304.
305.

Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 683 n. 6.
Id.
AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997), opinion amended on
F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Id.
The implantable cardiac defibrillators of Eli Lilly were Class III
medical devices.
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devices and not subject to § 156(a).3 ° 6 Rather than premarket approval
by the FDA, Class II devices require only a premarket notification
before sales 30 7. Therefore, the submissions to the FDA are quite
different.
In expanding the application of the statutory experimental use
exception beyond Class III devices, the Federal Circuit acknowledged
the differences between the regulation of Class II and Class III
devices. 30 8 The Abtox court recognized that the Supreme Court had
previously noted that the approval process for Class II devices "is by no
means comparable" to the premarket approval necessary for Class III
devices. 30 9 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that Class
III devices have a much more strict premarket approval process and are
subject to "specific controls," while Class I and II devices are only
subject to "general controls. 310
In spite of those differences in regulation, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the statutory symmetry between § 156(a) and the
experimental use exception discussed by the Eli Lilly Court was
preferable but not required. Under a broad interpretation of Eli Lilly, the
Abtox court reiterated that the "Federal Law" referred to the entire
scheme of federal regulation and not just specific provisions. 311 i
doing so, the Abtox court noted that the statutory language did not limit
the experimental use exception to drugs or a specific class of medical
devices. 312 Additionally the Abtox court held that an invention need not
be subject to § 156 in order to be subject to the statutory experimental
use exception. 3 13 In doing so, the Federal Circuit relied on the Eli Lilly
Court's acknowledgement of possible situations where "a patentee will
obtain the advantage of the [§ 156] extension but not suffer the
disadvantage of the [experimental use exception] non-infringement
provision, and others in which he will suffer the disadvantage without
the benefit." 314 As a result of its holding, the Abtox court expanded the
application of the statutory experimental use exception to every class of
medical device and shifted the focus to whether the invention was used
in a manner reasonably related to FDA submissions.

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

AbTox, Inc., 122 F.3d at1028.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
AbToxlnc., 122 F.3dat 1029.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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3. Defining "Reasonably Related"
A separate line of cases dealt with how to define "uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information" to the FDA.
Again, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the statute, leaving much
room for companies developing new products to invoke the statutory
experimental use exception.
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. is the leading Supreme

Court case on the issue and established a broad definition of research
that is "reasonably related" in the context of FDA submission. 3 5 In
Merck, Integra Lifesciences (Integra) owned five patents that covered a
set of peptides with a specific sequence (the RGD peptides).3 16 Merck
KGaA and Scripps Research Institute (collectively, Merck) conducted
preclinical research on the RGD peptides without knowing which, if
any, peptide eventually would lead to an FDA submission.317 After
eight years of research, Merck narrowed the RGD peptides to a few drug
candidates, and an IND was filed on the lead candidate two years
thereafter. 31 8 Integra sued for patent infringement; Merck defended
using the statutory experimental use exception.
In reviewing Merck's potentially infringing use of the RGD peptides,
the Court held that preclinical research on patented inventions is
protected under the statutory experimental use exception as long as there
is a reasonable basis to believe that the invention could become part of a

submission to the FDA. 319 The Merck Court noted that the statutory text
"extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related to
the development and submission of any information under the
FDCA. '' 320 The Merck Court's emphasis on any information is
potentially revealing as to how broadly the Supreme Court reads the
statutory experimental use exception.
Furthermore, the Merck Court held that the data does not necessarily
need to be included in a study submission. 321 The Court recognized the
uncertainty inherent in research and drug development. 322 "[I]t will not
always be clear to parties setting out to seek FDA approval for their new
product exactly which kinds of information, and in what quantities, it

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

545 U.S. 193 (2005).
Id.at 199.
Id.
Id. at 199.
Id.
at 202.
Merck, 545 U.S. at 202.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 207.
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will take to win that agency's approval. 32 3 Therefore, a narrow
interpretation of "reasonably related" would leave companies in constant
fear of being sued for patent infringement. Finally, the Merck Court did
not limit the types of studies covered by the statutory experimental use
exception to safety studies. However, basic research designed for
information rather than the "intent to develop" a drug would not be
covered because the Court saw such a connection to an FDA submission
as too attenuated.32 4
Since Merck, the Federal Circuit has further developed the
interpretation of "reasonably related." In Telectronics PacingSystems v.
Ventritex, 325 Telectronics accused Ventritex of patent infringement on
an implantable defibrillator. Ventritex sold the defibrillators at cost to
obtain data on the device's operation and displayed the device at
medical conferences to obtain clinical investigators. 326
While
Ventritex's CEO was attempting to raise money, he discussed the
327
ongoing clinical trials and the defibrillators to investors and the press.
The Telectronics court held that the demonstrations and conferences are
a use "that is reasonably related to FDA approval because device
sponsors are responsible for selecting qualified investigators and
providing them with the necessary information to conduct clinical
testing., 328 Also, the presentation of information about the trials is not
infringement because "dissemination of information" is not listed in the
statute as an infringing activity. 329 Finally, the Telectonics court
clarified that the statute allows data resulting from the exempted
330
infringement to also be used for non-FDA reporting purposes.
Telectronics has been followed by other courts which have held that
companies can use data gathered from exempted activities for many
other purposes as long as the data is originally gathered via activities
reasonably related to an FDA submission.3 3'
More recently, the Federal Circuit distinguished between mandated
studies and the routinely reported information developed through
nonrequired studies in post-marketing activities.
In Classen

323. Id. at 207 (citing Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal.
1991)), ajf'd by 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

324. Id. at 205.
325. 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

326. Id.
327. Id. at 1521.
328. Id. at 1523.

329. Id.
330. Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1524.

331. See, e.g., Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., Inc., No. 92-1076, 1993 WL 87405 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 22, 1993); Nexell Theraputics Inc., v. AmCell Corp., 143 F. Supp. 2d 407 (D. Del. 2001).
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Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC,332 the court held that the
statutory experimental use exception does not apply to infringing uses of
a patented invention if the uses were not mandated, even if the data was
routinely reported to the FDA.333 In Classen, Classen's patents were
infringed during studies evaluating the timing of vaccinations and
immune system disorders. While Classen was required to report the
"adverse experience information" to the FDA,3 34 the studies themselves
were not required by the FDA.
In contrast, in Momenta
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the
infringing use was subject to the statutory experimental use exception
even though the data was not actually submitted to the FDA. Rather,
per 21 C.F.R. § 211.180(c), the records were required to be "readily
available for authorized inspection" by the FDA at any time.335 In
Momenta, the infringing use produced data for the FDA proving that
each batch of Amphastar's product is the bioequivalent of the branded
drug. 336 The Momenta Court held that even if the FDA never inspects
the records, the requirement to maintain such records equates
to the
337
information being submitted under the language of the statute.
V. USAGE OF THE STATUTORY EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION BY THE
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY

Application of the statutory experimental use exception to GE crop
development is of utmost importance to the industry. As noted in the
Introduction, the one billion dollar award against DuPont and Pioneer
would have been a noninfringement verdict if the experimental use
exception applied to GE crop development. An analysis of Eli Lilly and
Merck indicate that the statutory experimental use exception should
apply to GE crops. Furthermore, data from activities covered by the
statutory experimental use exception can be used for other regulatory
activities under the Coordinated Framework.
A. Application of the Statutory Experimental Use Exception to
GeneticallyEngineered Crop Development
The industry consensus is that the statutory experimental use
exception does not apply to its development of GE crops due to the
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1070.
See 21 C.F.R. § 600.80 (2009).
Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id.
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statute's initial inclusion in a law directed toward human healthcare
products.338 Unfortunately, caselaw has been less than clear as to
whether the statutory experimental use exception applies to GE crops.
GE crops, usually regulated as GRAS, fall into a gray area between food
and food additives-each of which has a different outcome as to the
applicability of the statutory experimental use exception.
As described in Part IV, both the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit have broadly read and applied federal statutes to determine what
"patented inventions" can take advantage of the experimental use
exception. Clearly, GE crops and genetic traits are capable of being
patented inventions under Eli Lilly. However, two main issues must be
addressed before applying the statutory experimental use exception to
GE crops-the applicability of § 156(a) and whether industry uses are
"reasonably related" to submissions before the FDA. Unfortunately,
neither issue is particularly clear cut, but both should be read to allow
application of the statutory experimental use exception to GE crops.
1. Premarket Approval Under § 156(a)
It is tempting to declare that the applicability of § 156(a) to an
invention does not matter for the use of the statutory experimental use
exception. Federal Circuit caselaw interpreting Eli Lilly has applied the
statutory experimental use exception beyond inventions subject to
premarket approval under § 156(a). However, Eli Lilly predates the
FDA development of the GE crop regulatory scheme. Therefore, courts
are likely to look back to the statutory language as well as the current
state of the caselaw. Arguments of statutory interpretation are either
neutral or lean towards inclusion of GE crops under the statutory
experimental use exception.
Initially, the caselaw seems quite clear that premarket approval is not
required. In Abtox, the Federal Circuit held that manufacturers of Class
II medical devices, which are not subject to § 156(a), can use the
statutory experimental use exception. 339 A similar parallel can be drawn
to GRAS products. Food additives, like Class III medical devices, are
subject to § 156(a). GRAS products-like Class II devices-go through
a notification process before the FDA. Therefore, GRAS products
should be subject to the statutory experimental use exception due to
338. See, e.g., M.D. Janis, Rules versus Standardsfor PatentLaw in the Plant Sciences, in SEEDS
OF CHANGE, supra note 79, at 50; cf, Christopher Holman, District Court Rejects Argument that HatchWaxman Safe Harbor Applies to Genetically Modified Crops, HOLMAN'S BIOTECH IP BLOG (Nov. 29,
2012),
http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2012/1 1/district-court-rejects-argument-that.html
(discussing the potential applicability of the statutory experimental use exception to agriculture).
339. AbTox Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Abtox's holding
that "statutory symmetry is preferable but not
340
required.,
However, the Abtox decision was not appealed, and the Supreme
Court could disagree with such an analysis. The Abtox court recognized
that its holding, while complying with the holding in Eli Lilly, was in
conflict with the reasoning in that case. Specifically, the Abtox court
noted that
under the broad holding of Eli Lilly, all classes of
medical devices fall within the plain meaning of section
271(e)(1). Nevertheless, under the Court's narrower
justification of statutory symmetry, only Class III
devices fall within the section. Ultimately, this court
must follow the Supreme Court's broader holding, which
remains in force despite a potential conflict with its own
narrower reasoning.
Why would the Eli Lilly Court issue such a broad holding based on its
narrow reasoning of statutory symmetry? The Court answered this
question in footnote 4 of the opinion. There, the Eli Lilly Court noted
that it could not "readily imagine such situations [in which the patent
holder would suffer the disadvantage of the statutory experimental use
exception without the benefit of § 156(a)] . . . except where there is

good enough reason for the difference. 342 Food, as GRAS products are
considered by definition, has "generally applicable standards" to be met
rather than a notification process.343

However, the Eli Lilly opinion was issued in 1990, two years before
the 1992 Statement of Policy regarding the FDA's regulatory scheme for
GE crops. The Supreme Court could not then have foreseen the
regulatory schema that would include GE crops as GRAS products with
FDA consultations. As a result, it is conceivable that the Supreme Court
might take the view that the after-developed GE crop FDA regulatory
scheme does not fall under the Eli Lilly holding regarding § 156(a)
symmetry and should not be subject to the statutory experimental use
exception.
A narrow application seems in line with Professor Chen's reasoning
that statutory interpretation should result in a narrow construction of
statutes to retain Congressional intent. 344 However, Congress could
have specifically excluded agricultural products as a class from the
statutory experimental use exception if it had wished since a large part
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id. at 1029.
Id.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 683 n. 4 (1990).
Id. at 683 n. 6.
Chen, The Parable,supra note 30, at 135.
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of the FDA's job is food regulation. While Congress did not do so for
agricultural products, veterinary drugs are excluded specifically from
the statutory experimental use exception suggesting that agricultural
crops were intended to be included by Congress.
Additionally, although application of the statutory experimental use
exception to GE crops lacks the symmetry with § 156(a) present with
certain inventions in the healthcare industry, application to GE crops
does create a congruence with the PVPA discussed in Part II.B. The
PVPA provides intellectual property protection for crops and contains a
research exemption to patent infringement that is broader than the
statutory experimental use exception at issue in this Article. In fact, the
lack of a general experimental use exception for utility patents troubled
the Supreme Court in J.E.M. Ag Supply and led to a dissent penned by
Justice Breyer as to the patentability of plants. 345 Therefore, it seems
reasonable that the lack of § 156(a) symmetry would not bar application
of the statutory experimental use exception.
However, at this point, the argument regarding § 156(a) symmetry is
mere conjecture. There is no current indication from the Supreme Court
that it might treat GE crops differently from other FDA regulated
products. Therefore, under the Federal Circuit's Abtox opinion, GE
crops should be eligible for the statutory experimental use exception as
GRAS products even without § 156(a) premarket approval so long as
the use by the potential infringer is "reasonably related" to a submission
to the FDA.
2. "Reasonably Related"
While it seems highly likely that GE crops regulated as GRAS food
additives would be products for the purposes of the statutory
experimental use exception, the question as to whether the research
conducted during their development is "reasonably related" to a
submission to the FDA is less clear. The classification of GE crops as
food additives with likely GRAS designations makes the analysis more
complicated.
Food additives generally would be covered by the statutory
experimental use exception. While there is no caselaw directed at food
additives per se, dicta in Eli Lilly indicates food additives would be part
of the expansion of the statutory experimental use exception beyond
drugs. Food additives mirror the approval process of drugs and Class III
medical devices. All three require FDA premarket approval and are

345. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 147-56 (2001).
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subject to § 156(a).346 Indeed, food additives are listed along with drugs
and medical devices in the reasoning of Eli Lilly in contradistinction to
the categories excluded from coverage by the language of the statutory
347
experimental use exception.
While the FDA has stated its expectation that most GE crops will
qualify as GRAS, the FDA has left open the possibility that some crops
may need to be regulated as a food additive.3 48 If the data shows
potential increases in allergenicity or toxicity, the GE crop will be
regulated as a food additive rather than receiving premarket approval.34 9
Those GE crops regulated as food additives would clearly qualify for the
statutory experimental use exception.
In contrast, food is unlikely to be covered by the statutory
experimental use exception-and GRAS products are by definition food
rather than food additives. 350 The inapplicability of the statutory
experimental use exception to food comes from footnote 6 of Eli
Lilly.35 1 There the Court discusses the broad application of the statutory
experimental use exception to all products but counters that food, among
other things, merely has "generally applicable standards" to be met
rather than any sort of submission to the FDA. 352
GE crops, as GRAS products, then inhabit a gray area between food
additives and food. While GRAS products are technically food rather
than food additives, manufacturers develop crops and data regarding
safety and make their own determinations as to whether the GE crop
qualifies for GRAS status. If the manufacturer believes a new GE crop
is GRAS, the manufacturer initiates a voluntary consultation process to
notify the FDA of the crop development and GRAS status.3 53 This
voluntary consultation is different from the Class II medical devices of
Abtox, which have a mandatory notification requirement.
It is the voluntary nature of this process that leads one to initially
reject use of the statutory experimental use exception by the agricultural
biotechnology industry.
Indeed, in some ways, the voluntary
consultation process looks like the "routinely reported data" of Classen.
Neither the studies in Classen nor the consultation with the FDA are
mandatory. In both cases, if a company opted to complete the studies or
the consultation, then the reporting of the data would become required.

346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 672.
Id. at 674.
1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 165, at § VII.
Id.
See supra note 159 (defining GRAS).
Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 674 n. 6.
Id.
1992 Statement of Policy, supranote 165, at § V.
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Therefore, the reasoning would be that neither is covered by the
statutory experimental use exception.
In theory, a GE crop manufacturer could skip the consultation process
and market the crop with only USDA and EPA approvals. However, in
practice, every GE crop manufacturer has gone through the voluntary
process. Since the FDA does have authority to remove a GE crop from
the market if it has concerns over safety, no GE crop manufacturer has
ever declined to go through the "voluntary" process. 35 If the process is
voluntary in theory, but mandatory in practice, perhaps a court would
look to spirit rather than the letter of the law.
Additionally, while the consultation is voluntary, the development of
data by the GE crop manufacturer is not. GRAS determination
"require(s) the same quantity and quality of scientific evidence as is
required to obtain approval of a food additive regulation for the
ingredient. [A GRAS determination] shall ordinarily be based upon
published studies which may be corroborated by unpublished studies
and other data and information." 355 In the case of a new GE crop
consultation, the developing manufacturer must submit data regarding
the newly developed crop to demonstrate that it does not differ
significantly from non-GE crops in order to make the GRAS
determination. This data must be developed even if the data is never
submitted to the FDA. These privately held records for GRAS
determination-records that a court could order be shared with the FDA
if the agency suspected safety issues with a marketed GE crop-seem
more in line with the holding in the Momenta case in which the statutory
experimental use exception was applied where the FDA rarely bothered
to inspect records but the generation of data and record availability were
required.
Additionally, while Classen held routine, nonmandatory submissions
were not covered by the statutory experimental use exception, the
infringing activity in that case occurred post market approval. In
contrast, the cases that deal with data submission in a premarket context
take a broad view of the type of activity that qualifies as reasonably
related to a submission. For example, in Merck, the Supreme Court
noted the wide applicability of the statutory experimental use exception
in "activities related to the federal regulatory process."3 5 6 The Court

further rejected the idea that information gathered should be excluded
from the statutory experimental use exception based on "the particular
submission in which it could be included.
354.
355.
356.
357.

3 57

Therefore, a submission

See Johnson, supra note 223, Interview with Val Giddings.
21 C.F.R. § 170.30(b) (2012).
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifsciences 1, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005).
Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

53

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4

206

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 84

of data for a voluntary consultation process with the FDA should be
"reasonably related to a submission" for purposes of the statutory
experimental use exception.
Further bolstering the argument for the applicability of the statutory
experimental use exception to GE crops is the uncertainty of the GRAS
determination. If a manufacturer, after developing a GE crop, or the
FDA determined that there were potentially heightened allergenicity or
toxicity problems, the manufacturer would need to seek premarket
approval of the GE crop as a food additive. The Merck Court used this
uncertainty in the type of information needed to seek FDA approval as a
basis for its broad reading of the application of the statutory
experimental use exception to "submission of any information under the
FDCA. ' '358 Therefore, as long as there is any reasonable potential that
the data developed could be submitted to the FDA as part of a food
additive premarket approval application or could be required by the
FDA due to aftermarket safety concerns, the use of a patented trait or
GE crops to develop the data should be covered by the statutory
experimental use exception.
Thus, while the consensus of many in the legal world is that the
statutory experimental use exception does not apply to the agricultural
biotechnology industry's development of GE crops, there are significant
legal arguments as to why it should apply to research for submissions to
the FDA.
However, the tri-agency nature of the Coordinated
Framework poses special considerations for the application of the
statutory experimental use exception analysis.
B. Use of the Statutory Experimental Use Exception Under the
CoordinatedFramework

Using the statutory experimental use exception while being regulated
under the Coordinated Framework will be fraught with difficult
decisions. The Coordinated Framework regulating bioengineered foods
complicates the development of GE crops. GE crop developers must
comply with regulations from various agencies when the statutory
experimental use exception has thus far only been applied to regulatory
submissions to the FDA. Conversely, the Coordinated Framework
yields some flexibility. By leaving the decision of whether to proceed
as a GRAS product or a food additive in the purview of the developer,
the Coordinated Framework allows a GE crop developer to relieve some
uncertainty regarding the application of the statutory experimental use
exception.
358. Id.
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1. Exempted Activities Used for Non-FDA Purposes
Unlike pharmaceuticals, GE crops are regulated not solely by the
FDA. Rather, GE crops are regulated under a Coordinated Framework
that involves the FDA, USDA, and EPA working together to regulate
different aspects of the GE crop. 359 As a result, the developer of a new
GE crop could potentially conduct infringing uses to develop
submissions for the USDA or the EPA rather than the FDA.3 6 °
Even if the submission of data to the FDA exempts the activities to
collect that data from patent infringement, it is important to remember
that the USDA and EPA regulations generally have no experimental use
exception for patent infringement. Importantly for a follow-on GE crop
innovator, the Telectonics court clarified that the statute allows data
resulting from exempted patent infringement to be also used for nonFDA reporting purposes. 36 1 Therefore, experimentation that results in
data for FDA submission is exempt from patent infringement even if
that data is also used for a submission to the USDA or EPA.3 62
However, infringing activities not used to develop data for submissions
to the FDA would not qualify for the statutory experimental use
exception. Because of this, a GE crop developer might not be able to
complete all regulatory requirements before patent expiration.
Additionally, it may be quite difficult for a GE crop developer to keep
the various uses separate, increasing risk of liability.
One caveat to this analysis could potentially expand the use of the
statutory experimental use exception beyond submissions to the FDA.
As discussed above,3 63 the EPA's authority to regulate GE crops is
derived from the FIFRA, the TSCA, and the FDCA. The FDCA
establishes the EPA's responsibility for regulating and establishing
tolerance levels for pesticide residues in foods.3 64 Combining the EPA's
authority under the FDCA with the Eli Lilly Court's holding that the
language of the statute points to the entire statutory scheme of regulation
by the FDCA,3 65 the mandatory regulatory submissions to the EPA
regarding pesticides expressed by GE crops could be covered by the

359. Seesupra Part 1I.D.
360. See Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Defining Limits to the Application of the Statutory Experimental
Use Exception within the Agricultural Biotechnology Industry, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REv. 509 (2015)
[hereinafter Carter-Johnson, Defining Limits].
361. Telectronics Pacing Sys. v. Ventitrex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
362. Id.
363. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
364. 21 U.S.C. §§ 346(a), 348 (2006). As noted above, the EPA regulates pesticides expressed by
GE plants themselves (known as "plant-incorporated protectants"), such as crops expressing the Bt
pesticide.
365. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661,666 (1990).
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statutory experimental use exception. Such an expansion would be the
first to apply the statutory experimental use exception outside of the
FDA regulations.
2. Foregoing GRAS Determination
Until the ambiguities surrounding the application of the statutory
experimental use exception to GRAS GE crops are resolved, perhaps the
better choice for GE crop manufacturers is to forego GRAS
determination and declare newly developed GE crops as food additives,
due to food additives being far more likely to have the protection of the
statutory experimental use exception based on Eli Lilly dicta.
Additionally, there are several other benefits that make pursuing food
additive designations the better alternative. Such benefits include cost,
intellectual property protection, and public perception.
Counterintuitively, it may be cheaper to develop a GE crop as a food
additive. Since similar data must be developed for GRAS products or
food additives, the cost difference lies in the regulatory cost. While the
food additive process likely is more expensive, that cost is likely offset
by the decreased need to license every technology during development.
If the Monsanto court was correct in its one billion dollar damage
award, patent license savings could be significant. Of course, marketing
of the GE crop would still require a license or patent expiration, but
developing a crop with a patented trait would no longer require waiting
until the patent expired.
A second consideration in choosing a food additive pathway is a
limited amount of intellectual property protection during development.
A GRAS application should include primarily public data and
information while a food additive application can be based primarily on
proprietary data. In a post-Myriad era where gene patent protections
have been weakened, keeping genetic constructs used in GE crop
development as trade secrets may be attractive. However, these trade
secrets would last only until the crop is marketed. Once marketed, GE
crops can be reverse engineered relatively easily to determine the trait
and construct used in construction of the GE crop.
Finally, consumer perception of GE crops might be enhanced if the
FDA were viewed as having more oversight. One of the complaints put
forth by GE crop opponents is that there are no required safety studies.
If a GE crop developer submitted to food additive regulations, the
company could advertise its crops as having gone through a more
intensive FDA oversight process. Such a benefit likely is less valuable
to producers of commodity GE crops than for a crop that would be
marketed directly to consumers, who may be choosing among GE and
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non-GE versions.

VI. EXPERIMENTAL USE IN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGYA BROADER PERSPECTIVE
In addition to the legal analysis of whether the statutory experimental
use exception can be used in the agricultural biotechnology space, there
is the question of whether an experimental use exception should be used.
A high-level comparison of the pharmaceutical and agricultural
biotechnology industries makes an experimental use exception
attractive. However, such a radical change in infringement liability
certainly would herald a change in business strategies and perhaps even
in the structure of the agricultural biotechnology industry itself.
Additionally, the near term expiration of many GE trait and crop patents
makes now a good time to begin discussing whether applying the
Hatch-Waxman Act within the agricultural biotechnology industry is a
good decision because the development of a generic GE crop industry
would be influenced by the availability of an experimental use
exception.
A. Industry Structure and Innovation Incentives as Factorsin
Consideringan Experimental Use Exception
While this Article focuses on an analysis of the Hatch-Waxman
statutory experimental use exception, a brief discussion of whether any
experimental use exception should be applied to the agricultural
biotechnology industry is valuable. For example, the common law
experimental use exception discussed in Part II.B.3. applies to all
technologies. However, that common law experimental use exception
has been narrowed by the courts, making it practically inapplicable to
any industry. 366 In order to analyze the application of an experimental
use exception to GE crops, it is important to consider incentives to
innovate and the resulting industry structure.36 7
The directive to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" was

366. See supra Part II.B.2. Additionally, the history of the common law experimental use
exception has been detailed before. See, e.g., Janis, Sustainable Agriculture, supra note 131, at 105,
106-08; Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Unveiling the Distinction between the University and its Academic
Researchers:Lessons for PatentInfringement and University Technology Transfer, 12 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 473, 498 (2010) [hereinafter Carter-Johnson, Unveiling the Distinction].
367. This Article does not purport to make a full analysis of the economic incentives of the
agricultural biotechnology industry. For a fuller treatment, see the authors cited herein. Rather, I
merely want to establish a fuller context for any discussion of the implementation of the statutory
experimental use exception.
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important enough to enshrine in our Constitution.368 As a result,
Congress enacted the laws creating the patent system.369 In light of this,
any experimental use exception should be implemented only if promotes
innovation rather than hinders it. However, the question of the extent to
which strong patents promote rather than hinder progress is beyond the
scope of this Article. Additionally, many scholars have debated the
application of an experimental use exception in various contexts. 370
A few scholars have argued for the use of an experimental use
exception in agriculture. 37 1 For example, in her article on intellectual
property overreaching in the agriculture industry, Professor Elizabeth
Rowe suggested that an experimental use exception similar that of the
pharmaceutical industry would be valuable 372 for innovation and
regulatory decision making. As noted above, Mark Janis sees the
experimental use exception as a means to promote sustainable
agriculture.373 Others, however, have argued that innovation in the
agricultural biotechnology
industry is optimal and there is no need to
374
adjust patent incentives.
The industry structure seems to support Rowe and Janis. In the past
forty years, the industry has continually consolidated based in part on
the strong patent protection held by the major companies. 375 Contrast
this trend with that in the pharmaceutical biotechnology space where
there are thousands of small companies striving to create the next new
drug or biologic. 376 While there are too many differences between the
two industries to say that the availability of an experimental use
exception is the key to diversifying research in the agricultural
368. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
369. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
370. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM L.
REv.1 177 (2000); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an
Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIz. L. REv.457 (2004); Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental
Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J.

921 (2006); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017 (1989); and Carter-Johnson, Unveiling the Distinction,
supra note 366, at 498.
371. See e.g., Janis, Sustainable Agriculture, supra note 131, at 105; Rowe, supra note 57, at 889;
DIANA L. MOSS, THE AM. ANTI-TRUST INST., GENERIC COMPETITION IN TRANSGENIC SOYBEANS
-

10

(2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract 1940150.
372. Rowe, supra note 57, at 886.
373. Janis, Sustainable Agriculture,supra note 131, at 105.
374. F. Scott Kieffet al., supranote 128.
375. See Howard, supra note 123.
376. There were over three thousand companies working on drug candidates in the clinical
pipeline in 2014. David Thomas & Chad Wessel, Emerging Therapeutic Company Investment and
Deal
Trends,
BIO
INDUSTRY
ANALYSIS,
10
(2015),
https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/BIO%2Emerging%2Therapeutic%22Company/20Report%2
June%201 1%202015.pdf.
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biotechnology industry, at least one scholar has indicated that
Monsanto's patent protection on nearly all commercial transgenic traits
was key in its ability to consolidate. 377
The availability of an
experimental use exception would have negated some of Monsanto's
negotiation power since the long development timelines of GE crops
would have allowed consolidation targets to continue research until
Monsanto's patent expired.
Critics, such as Monsanto, might argue that implementation of a
statutory experimental use exception to GE crops would decrease
incentives to innovate, as licensing powers would be greatly lessened or
that the statutory experimental use exception could amount to a
governmental taking. Neither of these arguments is compelling.
While the license value of patents related to GE crops might decrease,
it is unlikely to disappear altogether. Not all inventions created by the
agricultural biotechnology industries are crops. Many are methods of
creating crops or determining which genetic mutations to pursue. Such
inventions are described as research tools and have been patented widely
within the industry.3 78 Research tools are not subject to the statutory
experimental use exception. 379 Additionally, small companies still
would need a license to the patents to the GE crop itself if they wanted
to sell patent protected GE crops before the patent expires.
Experimental use exceptions have never allowed for sales of infringing
goods. Companies that desire to sell products before patent expiration
would likely partner with Monsanto by licensing during development
rather than be stuck with a product that could not be sold for years. An
experimental use exception would merely prevent Monsanto from
stalling follow-on research on its patented crops.
Monsanto also could argue that the implementation of an
experimental use exception would be a taking under Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto.3 8 ° In Ruckelhaus, the EPA required disclosure and sharing of
trade secret data protected under FIFRA.381 Monsanto's trade secrets
were held to be property protected by the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause.3 82 While the implementation of an experimental use exception
would change the contours of the patent protection available to
Monsanto, such a change would be no different than the invalidation of

377. Howard, supra note 123, at 1274.
378. For a full discussion of the types of patented inventions created by agricultural biotechnology
companies and the application of the statutory experimental use exception to research tools, see CarterJohnson, Defining Limits, supra note 360.
379. Id.
380. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
381. Id. at 994-95.
382. Id. at 1003-04.
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any gene patents after the Myriad decision or the implementation of the
Hatch-Waxman Act in the healthcare industry. This analysis is unlike
that of Ruckelshaus, where the type of information at issue continued to
be protected as a trade secret but a specific piece of information was
taken from Monsanto alone. Instead, all GE crops would become
subject to the statutory experimental use exception as the contours of
patent protection change when courts interpret statutory language.
B. Technological Similarities and Regulatory Framework as Factorsin
Consideringan Experimental Use Exception
Another question raised by GE traits and crops is whether the same
basic technology used in different industries should have different patent
protections. As noted in the Introduction, an experimental use exception
can be a big deal if applied to patent rights valued at one billion dollars.
Patent law protection is generally considered to be technologically
neutral.383 In spite of this theoretical technological neutrality, some
scholars have questioned whether the application of patent law is
actually technology specific. 384 However, most scholarly work focuses
on the different treatment of patent law in regards to different types of
technology-such as the differences between software and
biotechnology. 385 Even Dan Burk and Mark Lemley's book, The Patent
Crisis and How The Courts Can Solve It, which does explore proposed
industry-specific patent applications, 386 does not discuss the
387
experimental use exception.
Much like its pharmaceutical cousin, the agricultural biotechnology
industry is a FDA regulated industry that is highly structured around
patent-protected, biologically related products. Similarities between the
two industries in the realm of technology-both development and final
products-and regulation point to a need for the application of the
statutory experimental use exception.
At their bases, GE crops and pharmaceuticals share several
technological characteristics.
Both types of products are human
inputs-that is, both generally are ingested to support life and wellness.
383. See generally Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Is PatentLaw Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific].
384. Id. Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle,54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 691,691-92 (2004).
385. See generally Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 383.
386. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE
IT (2009).
387. Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 (NYU Center for Law, Economics, and
Organization Law & Economic Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-18),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=l 835007.
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As such, these products have far more potential for immediate harm than
other technologies and this is reflected in the regulatory structures
discussed above.
More specifically, the technology used to produce GE crops mirrors
the technology used to produce some pharmaceuticals, such as
biologics. Biologics typically involve large molecular structures
produced by living organisms.388 GE crops are entire living organisms
in and of themselves. GE crops can be far more complicated than even
the largest biologic. Additionally, the same molecular biology-based
tools are used to produce biologics and GE crops. Both require direct
manipulation at the genetic level to produce the product. GE crops
require insertion of genetic traits into plants by definition. Biologic
development often requires similar389insertions into bacteria or other cells
to produce the biologic of interest.
The similarities in the technology underlying the products are further
bolstered by the similarities in their research and development. Much as
in the pharmaceutical industry, the initial expense of development and
uncertainty of success leads investors to desire larger profits in order to
invest. Additionally, both industries are plagued with long development
time lines. 390 Finally, similar to biologics, the ability to replicate or
produce a bioequivalent may be uncertain. Inserting a genetic trait into
a plant or bacteria is a fairly straightforward procedure technologically.
However, the placement of the gene within the genome may impact its
expression or may impact the expression of the endogenous surrounding
genes.3 91 These difficulties lead to further characterization problems for
potential generics for both biologics and GE crops.
Similarities between the structure and regulation of the
pharmaceutical and agricultural biotechnology industries also make the
application of an experimental use exception to GE crop development
attractive. First and foremost, both industries produce products that are
heavily regulated. As described in depth in this Article, the FDA
388. Under the FDCA, biologics-or rather a biological product--"means a virus, therapeutic
serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein ... or
analogous product.., applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human
beings." 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2012). See also Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding&
Incentivizing Biosimilars,58 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 59 (2012).

389. See supra Part II.A.3.
390. MOSS, supra note 371, at 10.
391. Random insertion of a transgene into a plant's genome may result in the inserted transgene
disrupting sequences necessary for the proper regulatory control of endogenous genes. Furthermore, the
actual location in the genome at which the transgene inserts may affect the expression of the transgene
itself, a phenomena known as positional effects. See e.g., Christopher D. Day et al., Transgene
integration into the same chromosome location can produce alleles that express at a predictable level,
or alleles that are differentially silenced, 14 GENES & DEV. 2869 (2000); Maike Stain et al., The Silence
of Genes in TransgenicPlants, 79 ANNALS OF BOTANY 3 (1997).
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regulates both industries. To the extent that the voluntary nature of the
FDA regulations is a concern, the agricultural biotechnology industry is
also mandatorily regulated by the EPA and the USDA-APHIS.
Extensive tests and submissions that increase the cost of developing
products are required in both industries. As a way to recoup these costs,
players in both industries rely on patent protection to establish
monopoly pricing for their products and to control the development of
competing products.
Following from that basic structure is the fact that the agricultural
biotechnology industry must deal with the expiration of patents and
competitor attempts to use and sell previously patent protected
technology.
The pharmaceutical industry has dealt with patent
expiration and generics for years. However, the first GE-crop patents
expired in 2014, and the agricultural biotechnology industry is
struggling to deal with the resulting repercussions for the first time.
As patents expire, the agricultural biotechnology industry is facing
similar pressures as the pharmaceutical industry with regards to pricing.
Food prices are rising due to increased input costs such as seed, fuel,
and irrigation. 392 The world's population is also increasing, putting
additional demand pressure on pricing. Farmers are pressured to
produce ever more food for less cost. One compromise is to use highyielding generic GE traits for which there is no longer a patent-premium
price tag. 393 However, without an experimental use exception,
regulatory hurdles may delay generic seed producers from entering the
market.
C. Hatch- Waxmanizing the AgriculturalBiotechnology Industry

A discussion about applying the Hatch-Waxman statutory
experimental use exception in the agricultural biotechnology industry is
merely the first step in a broader dialog. Monsanto's Roundup Ready
394
patents expired in 2014, and more trait patents will expire soon.
Next, it must be decided whether the agricultural biotechnology industry
needs a Hatch-Waxman-esque abbreviated pathway for generic GE crop
approval. It is also time for a discussion of how to define generic GE
395
crops. Scholars are beginning to discuss both issues.

392. Forty percent of the final seed price for patented GE crops is due to research and
development. Moss, supranote 371, at 8.
393. Norman W. Hawker, Competition Issues Arising from Generic Biotech Crops, 18 DRAKE J.
OFAG. L. 137, 139 (2013).
394. Id. at 140.
395. .d. MOSS, supra note 371, at 8; Christopher Holman, How Real Is the Concern That Seed
Patents WVill Turn Farmersinto InadvertentInfringers?,33 BIoTEcH. L. REP. 165, 168 (2014).
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The first question to be addressed is the definition of a generic GE
crop, which may require a new nomenclature. In general, a generic
Monsanto Roundup Ready soybean can be reproduced quickly and
easily by planting a seed. Farmers have been saving seed for years, and
the technology to do so is well settled. Abbreviated approval pathways
are less helpful for such generics. But what of the development of new
crops using generic glyphosate-resistant gene technology once the
patents on the traits expire? Are those new crops considered genericseven if the patent-expired trait is stacked with a new patented trait?
Without a statutory experimental use exception, the development of
such crops can only begin after patent expiration. These follow-on
crops using expired patent traits would most benefit from an abbreviated
pathway.
For both sets of potential generic crops, data access is also an issue.
Since GRAS data can be proprietary, follow-on crops using patentexpired traits would need access to approval documentation and data in
order to prove some sort of bioequivalency.39 6 Furthermore, generic
seeds saved from expired, branded GE crops will eventually need to
renew regulatory approvals for export.
Those approvals also require
397
access to the initial development data.
VII. CONCLUSION

The statutory experimental use exception potentially would change
the face of the agricultural biotechnology industry. Its application to GE
crops regulated as GRAS is unclear, but there is a valid legal argument
for its use by the industry.
The breadth of the Eli Lilly Court's interpretation of "patented
invention," combined with the Abtox court's decision to include
inventions not subject to § 156(a) leaves open only the question of
development activities being "reasonably related" to submissions to the
FDA.
Although the Coordinated Framework makes the FDA
submissions technically voluntary, the Supreme Court's broad
interpretation of a submission to the FDA, along with its desire to
relieve uncertainties for the developer, make a strong case that the
statutory experimental use exception should apply to the development of
GE crops.
The application of the statutory experimental use exception has the
potential to change the balance of power within the agricultural
biotechnology industry. Currently, the industry is dominated by a few

396. MosS, supra note 371, at 8.
397. Hawker, supra note 393, at 144.
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large companies that hold all the patents. New companies are locked
out of developing GE crops until the existing patents expire, unless they
are willing to enter into expensive limiting licenses with the current
patent holders.
Even if courts decline to extend the statutory experimental use
exception to GE crops, the development of an experimental use
exception for the agricultural biotechnology industry is a viable idea.
Whether developed as a stand-alone experimental use exception or as
part of an entire system to encourage the development of a generic
subset to the industry, the Hatch-Waxman Act's statutory experimental
use exception could play an important role in directing the discussion.
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